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EAST ASIA

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

Does the economic future belong to East Asia? Japan seems to believe so, and Takashi Inoguchi spells out what the country's role will be in the economic and political development of the region.

The United States, however, has yet to devise a coherent strategy toward East Asia and some, like Donald Hellmann, would argue that it has no strategy other than the Bush administration's vague concept of a "new world order," which "rapidly passed through the life cycle of a sound bite."

The lack of United States interest in the region is most apparent in the case of Cambodia, where an uneasy peace accord has been implemented with minimal United States attention. Japan, under UN auspices, has taken a leading role in coordinating economic aid to the country and has also sent peacekeeping forces—the first deployment of Japanese troops outside the country since World War II. Neither action has elicited an American reaction; the silence is especially noteworthy since the United States has prodded Japan, along with Germany, to play a larger role in world affairs.

Two other articles also focus on Southeast Asia. David Wurfel reviews the recent elections in the Philippines and the impact of the United States withdrawal from the islands, while Joseph Wright explains what led to the "Thai Tiananmen": the shooting of pro-democracy protestors in Bangkok this year and the fallout from the killings.

One of the oddest events in the region—the reconciliation talks between North and South Korea and the possibility of the reunification of the capitalist south with the communist north—is examined by Hong Nack Kim.

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In designing a global policy for a changed world—especially economically powerful Asia—“an international division of labor in which America maintains order and the Japanese give aid (like the one the Bush administration agreed to), will work only in a new world order devised by Lewis Carroll.”

The United States and Asia in an Age of International Upheaval

BY DONALD C. HELLMANN

The twilight period that has followed the cold war's end has brought uncertainty and perplexity to the United States and many Asian nations. Pax Americana in the Pacific after World War II was a success both for the hegemon and for the region's nations that prospered in the American-made security and free trade greenhouse, all having enjoyed a kind of international paradise that could now be lost.¹ United States officials acknowledge that American foreign policy toward East Asia stands at a crossroads and imply that the future cannot be an extension of the past. However, the policy actions undertaken have been responses to crises or the initiatives by other nations; the approach to the region, especially toward Japan, has been passive and incremental. This reactive

and stolid style devoid of fresh strategic thinking is truly extraordinary for the leading world power during a time of international fluidity, when the possibilities for statesmanship are so accessible.

The explanation for such immobilism is partly personal: a president obsessed with foreign policy who nonetheless publicly chided himself about his trouble with “the vision thing.” It also involves government policymaking institutions shackled by partisan differences between Congress and the president and the tendency toward inertia of bureaucracies established to conduct the cold war. Finally, an intellectual and political sclerosis is evident in the American foreign policy establishment that stands in sharp contrast to the vision and verve that went into crafting the international institutions for “America's century” after the second world war. Beyond the occasional Pentagon study, there has been no effort to devise a comprehensive new strategy toward Asia or the rest of the world that looks beyond cold war assumptions or the constraints imposed by a federal budget now chronically in deficit.² Consequently, the most significant feature of the current American approach to Asia is not what has been done but rather what has not. The failure of the United States, the leader of the coalition that won the last big war—the cold war—to create institutions to manage a still inchoate new world order during the transition from one age to another is both astonishing and historically unprecedented.

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¹This article draws heavily on the author's recent and forthcoming publications on this subject, especially “America and Asia in the Twilight of the Cold War,” Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, October 1, 1990; “Future Strategic Options in the Pacific: A Nichibei Condominium?” in Dora Alves, ed., *New Perspectives for U.S.-Asia Pacific Security Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992); and *The United States and Japan in the Current Age of International Upheaval* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming).

²See, for example, “A Strategic Framework for Asia: Looking into the 21st Century,” US Department of Defense, June 1990.

VISION FOR AN ERA OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

The second half of the twentieth century was dominated by the cold war, a protracted global confrontation between the United States, the Soviet Union and

their allies on ideological, geopolitical, and economic planes. The prospect of a nuclear holocaust forestalled the physical devastation previous world wars had brought, but the cold war did create updated variants of empires (the East and West blocs), legitimated the framework for the remarkably successful American-led global economic order, cast its shadow over the occasions and the forms of war, and severely (in the case of the Soviet Union, fatally) affected the politics and the economies of the two superpowers. Not surprisingly, the conflict's sudden end after 40 years has created many of the fundamental discontinuities that followed the two previous great wars of this century; it has also provided the occasion and the need for statesmanship.

The political and military aspects of the cold war ended with communism's collapse in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but the strategic implications of this change and communism's eroded legitimacy lowered the curtain on the cold war in Asia as well—notwithstanding the persistence of Leninist states in China, Vietnam, and North Korea. Although effectively over, for the United States two special features of the cold war in Asia remain particularly important. First, despite the Korean and Vietnam wars, there was no multilateral military alliance like NATO and—bilateral arrangements with Korea and Japan notwithstanding—regional containment was essentially unilaterally supplied by the United States. In addition, American economic relations with Asia during the cold war also expanded without the tempering influence of regional institutions. East Asia became the world's fastest growing economic region, and now far outstrips Europe as the most important trading partner of the United States; the relationship between Japan and the United States has become the most important bilateral economic relationship in the world. However, no regional organization such as the European Community is in place, and the last 15 years have seen trade and other economic tensions increasing side by side with interdependence.

This absence of overarching institutions is symptomatic of an unadmitted but underlying feature of American policy toward Asia during the cold war: Asia was not (and still is not) accorded either the priority or the sophisticated attention that has been given to Europe. "Wanted: An Asian policy," a lament heard in the years immediately after World War II, is even more appropriate today. These three legacies from the immediate past are basic to any post-cold war American strategy toward Asia.

The conjunction of two earthquake-strength developments in the late 1980s reordered the international landscape and set into motion forces for change that continue to reshape the international system. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the political and

strategic confrontation at the heart of the cold war effectively came to an end. Second, the cumulative impact of more than four successful decades of the liberal world economic order had a number of unanticipated and unsettling results, among them the Pacific region's move to the center of the world economic stage, the rise of Japan as a global as well as regional economic power, and the relative economic decline of the United States.

It was these basic changes in the structure of the global economic system as much as the end of the cold war that created the revolutionary international upheaval of an intensity and scope seen only three other times in the last two centuries: after the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars I and II. In each of these previous ages of upheaval, statesmen from the winning coalition moved decisively to shape the still indeterminate new world order by creating institutions to manage the radically different distribution of political, economic, and military power resulting from the conflict; foreign policy was not left in the hands of those bureaucrats, military leaders, and diplomats responsible for the day-to-day conduct of international relations and bound by the policies and institutions in which they operated, but set instead by statesmen with a sense of vision and history. Prince Klemens von Metternich, Woodrow Wilson, Winston Churchill, and George Marshall exemplify the statesmen, and their products are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, the United Nations (and Bretton Woods), and the Pax Americana. No less is needed today.

Unfortunately, no vision of a post-cold war world system within which an Asian policy might be developed has been articulated by the United States. In 1990 President George Bush introduced the idea of a "new world order," but not because of a visionary impulse, or even a prudent desire to replace anachronistic alliances and international organizations with more appropriate ones. Rather, the concept was put forward because a rogue regime in Iraq invaded the neighboring oil-rich emirate of Kuwait. Without acquiring real substance, this sole idea that was intended to address the broad international challenges of the current age of upheaval rapidly passed through the life cycle of a sound bite, becoming a prisoner among the meandering words of presidential speechwriters until it died of overwork. In the absence of a coherent, long-term global strategy, United States policy toward Asia has moved from one issue to another on an agenda set by regional crises, initiatives by the Pacific countries themselves to create new arrangements for international cooperation, or by American domestic pressures.

The results of this ad hoc approach to foreign policy have been highly uneven. By reacting incrementally to specific problems, by not articulating a strategic concept to replace containment, by assuming that market-driven American capitalism and free trade were and

will be the keys to East Asian economic success, by seeking to breathe new life into institutions devised for other circumstances (for example, the Japanese-American alliance, the antiquated security system of the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the United States has successfully managed some specific issues in the short term but has only superficially related them to the utterly transformed international context. This is especially unfortunate in the Pacific, where the residual power and legitimacy of the United States and the absence of immediate crises provides an opportunity to shape a new security and economic order and to recast in a constructive way the grotesquely imbalanced "partnership" with Japan.

Despite the collapse of communism, democracy and economic interdependence cannot dissolve international strife in the post-cold war world without active management by certain nations of a complex balance of power involving military and economic factors. Enhanced interdependence notwithstanding, what will emerge is a new age of nationalism rather than internationalism. The persistence of nationalism in Asia, in fact, is one of the most important features of the region's politics and culture. Domestic politics in all major nations will influence their foreign policies to an unusual extent now that the cold war is over. International cooperation will remain a contingent product of policy, not the result of some economic or political invisible hand.

Indeterminacy will also be a dominant feature of the new international landscape, certainly for the near future. Even though the United States made extensive efforts during the last years of World War II to forecast the postwar order, these missed the most fundamental changes that would occur during that age of upheaval, such as the cold war and decolonization. However, when these unanticipated events took place they gave rise to a new strategic doctrine (containment), new institutions (the National Security Council, the Agency for International Development), and new policies (aid, alliances, and overseas military intervention). International indeterminacy spawned not immobilism but creative statesmanship.

Before making critical choices regarding Asia and the world in the years immediately ahead, the United States must examine anew the fundamental forces sustaining the current system. As a first step, it should initiate a review of its role in East Asia, especially with Japan, of the sort that was made in the late 1940s toward the Soviet Union. To do less will forfeit leadership in the Pacific to the shifting political tides of American domestic politics or international events in Asia. If the future belongs to those who succeed, it is in regard to the Pacific, and Japan especially, that the United States should make it a priority to structure a new strategic doctrine.

THE SUPERPOWER AND THE ECONOMIC FORCE

Despite escalating concern about Japanese-American relations, the critical questions are rarely asked and even more rarely answered. The first imperative regarding Japan and Asia is to see them in a global and historical context rather than a bilateral (or regional) and strictly contemporary perspective. The next imperative is to delineate the unique economic and political legacies of the cold war era.

Japan, which has become the world's largest creditor, the biggest dispenser of foreign aid, the leader in many high-technology industries, the dominant economic force in the world's fastest-growing region, and, as noted, the major overseas economic partner of the United States, nevertheless has emerged from the cold war without any security policy beyond dependence on the United States. America, though the only global military power and the nation with the largest gross national product, is, however, beset by economic problems that make leadership in the pattern of the cold war impossible. A viable adjustment of Japanese-American relations therefore requires linkage of economic and strategic policy considerations.

The security alliance now in place was crafted in the early years of the cold war, when a devastated and impoverished Japan was under American military occupation. That alliance is an anachronism, structured on assumptions about Japanese power and international behavior appropriate to the years immediately after World War II and on the international role the United States played during the height of the cold war in the 1950s and early 1960s. Perpetuating the relationship's asymmetry has recently led to a number of astonishing and inherently nonviable results. For example, the world's largest debtor nation effectively underwrites the security of the world's largest creditor; only this year, and then conditionally, did Japan agree to participate in United Nations or any other multilateral military activities overseas, despite possessing the world's third-largest defense force.

These anomalies, together with persistent and protracted bilateral friction over trade and investment, have provoked a strongly negative and increasingly populist reaction in the United States that in turn has stimulated highly visible anti-Americanism in Japan. In the United States, hostile Congressional actions (such as those surrounding the joint American-Japanese program to build the FSX fighter) have grown in number and intensity. In public opinion polls Japan has replaced the Soviet Union as the greatest perceived threat to the United States. The media have taken an increasingly adversarial position regarding Japan, and Japan was central to this year's hyperbolic presidential campaign rhetoric. These developments have introduced a volatile variable into bilateral relations and make the policy challenge for the United States president twofold: to bring the American-Japanese relation-

ship into greater congruence with international realities and at the same time to reestablish leadership on the issue domestically.

Although Japan's success has rightly been explained in terms of the brilliance of its internal political-economic organization or the inadequacies of American society and policies, a bedrock cause is the peculiar structure of the international system under the Pax Americana. Japan became a global economic superpower because the United States freed it from the political, psychological, and economic costs of participating in power politics. In both countries this has perpetuated the separation of economic and security policies, created institutional arrangements that impede appropriate policymaking, and raised the possibility that a "mutant" international actor will emerge as the international greenhouse comes down (see the opera buffa performance by Japan in the Persian Gulf war).

A second major legacy of the cold war era is the failure of Tokyo to come to terms with the ill will created during the decades of Japanese imperialism in the first half of this century and above all by the atrocities committed by the Japanese military throughout East Asia during World War II. Japan's refusal to admit responsibility and the systematic revision of textbooks to assure that younger generations of Japanese do not know what everyone else in Asia knows to be true—an official disinformation campaign with a scope otherwise seen only in authoritarian or totalitarian societies—has severely undermined Japan's capacity to be a leader in the region despite its dominant economic position. Ironically, Japan's failure to play an integral if subordinate military role in containing communism in Asia as West Germany did in Europe has kept the embers of doubt about irresponsible militarism smoldering. The cold war has left Japan shackled by the burdens of its history, unable to articulate a national purpose that transcends narrow self-interest.³ Japan achieved a position of economic power in Asia and in the rest of the world during the cold war era, but it lacks legitimacy, the critical ingredient for international leadership.

Another cold war legacy that bears on the mounting tension between Japan and the United States and the imperative to link economics and security in any new world order is what can be called the "paradox of interdependence." Paradoxically, the increased scope and intensity of economic interaction has created international competitors for state-centered foreign policy such as multinational corporations and international organizations while at the same time strengthening the role of economic interest groups in the making

of foreign policy, encouraging a kind of populist economic nationalism. Accordingly, those states, Japan among them, that are capable of a coherent industrial and foreign economic policy calibrated to enhance national power in the global marketplace behind a fig leaf of liberal economic verbiage are enormously rewarded. Conversely, the open and fragmented process of American economic foreign policymaking severely disadvantages the United States. The discontinuities between international economic power and international economic responsibilities have been perpetuated in large part because the United States has clung to the policies and institutions of the cold war.

Any attempt to reshape Japanese-American relations first confronts the question of who will provide leadership. Because of the close links between Japanese society and its political institutions, the reluctance of a successful nation to alter its course at the apex of its power, and Japan's seeming inability to articulate a national purpose with which others can identify, it is unlikely that Japan will take the initiative in fashioning a new world order. Any attempt to explicitly link security and economic policy must originate in Washington, and must foster institutional perestroika in Japan as well as in the United States. American leaders can bring this about by leveraging the victory in the last great war.

Second, the Japanese concept of foreign aid—essentially commercial in purpose, informally if not formally tied to Japanese products, self-consciously detached from the support of democracy and human rights and other political purposes—stands in stark contrast to the politically conditional American concept of aid. Consequently, an international division of labor in which America maintains order and the Japanese give aid (like the one the Bush administration agreed to), will work only in a new world order devised by Lewis Carroll. Burden-sharing must include military responsibilities roughly in proportion to economic power.

Third, an expanded role for Japan in multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and an expansion of the American role in the Asian Development Bank and other regional organizations must be related to similar bodies dealing with the maintenance of international order. The institutional legacies of the cold war for Japan and the United States provide an extreme example of how national policies are conditioned by the environment in which they operate, but also point the way to a realistic restructuring of bilateral relations.

FURTHER EXAMPLES

How have United States-cold war policies fared in the rest of East Asia? Four issues—relations with China, the closing of military bases in the Philippines, the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, and

³Kenneth Pyle has developed this point in *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1992).

relations with Korea—offer an answer. While this approach leaves lacunae in areas of special importance to the United States, most particularly relations with Cambodia, it does outline the critical dimensions of American policy in the region.

United States policy toward China has been caught up in and shaped by American domestic politics since the beginning of the cold war. China policy has long had a peculiarly moral overlay. At the outset of the cold war, the moral outrage of the conservative wing of the Republican party over the triumph of the Chinese Communists set in motion domestic political forces that blocked normalization of ties for more than two decades. Today it is liberals from the Democratic party who are in the forefront of those in Congress morally outraged over conciliatory gestures toward China after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Their moral considerations have spilled over into economic questions (most favored nation trade status) and security issues (export of technology and delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction), and present a formidable obstacle to any administration seeking to address flexibly the changing role of China in Asia. American policy toward the largest country and strongest military power in the region remains hostage to domestic politics and the American diplomatic tradition.

By projecting American military power into Southeast Asia and substantially affecting the domestic economy, the major American bases in the Philippines, Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station, served to cement the special relationship the United States had with its former colony. But in the 1980s Philippine nationalism with a vocal anti-American component, together with the altered strategic situation in the area, made at least a drawdown or redefinition of the American military presence inevitable. The United States had to choose between justifying the bases in traditional (that is to say, cold war-era) terms or defining a new reason for their continued presence. Lacking any new strategic concept, the United States responded to the request to leave that was signaled by a one-vote majority in the Philippine Senate's Foreign Relations Committee by negotiating the future in terms of past parameters rather than, for example, proposing the "internationalization" of Subic as part of a broader move toward a multilateral regional security force suitable for a post-cold war world. A volcanic eruption rendered Clark unusable on the eve of the United States eviction from Subic. In consequence, the biggest military change in Asia since the end of the cold war was made not by the winning hegemon but by a former client state—and sealed by an act of nature.

The territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over the four small islands north of Hokkaido is the one unresolved legacy of World War II in East Asia, and has served as a major obstacle to Japanese participation in one of the greatest contemporary

international challenges—preventing the collapse of the new countries that once constituted the Soviet Union. Because the United States was responsible for all of the postwar agreements that defined the status of the islands (for example, the Potsdam Declaration and the San Francisco Peace Treaty), remains responsible for security in the western Pacific, and has a special relationship with both Japan and Moscow, Washington is in a unique position to pursue the resolution of this dispute. However, instead of linking the issue to the broader question of post-cold war security, the United States supported the legally (although not historically) dubious claim of Japan to the two largest islands and then deliberately chose not to become actively involved.

The dispute goes on, largely because domestic political pressures severely constrain Russian President Boris Yeltsin on this matter. At one point the passivity of the United States almost made possible what would have been one of the most astonishing diplomatic events of modern times. Both Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Mizazawa agreed to listen to the mediation proposals of German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Had these efforts succeeded, Germany, Japan's Axis ally in World War II, would have negotiated an end to that war in the Pacific by mediating a dispute between Japan and the defeated hegemon of the cold war. The United States, the victor in both wars, would thus have allowed one element of the conditions of peace to be determined by the defeated parties. Only in a vacuum of statesmanship such as that currently seen in American policy toward Asia could such a scenario have been so close to realization.

Korea, a country still divided by the cold war, a military "flash point," and now the home to a potential nuclear pariah state, provides a situation that mandates a comprehensive United States policy approach. Again, this has not happened. Confronted with an environment in permanent crisis, both Seoul and Pyongyang have aggressively pursued their own interests. South Korea, responding to the events attendant with the end of the cold war, has cultivated extensive economic ties and established formal diplomatic relations with China and Russia. North Korea, frustrated by these events and its own aborted attempt to expand economic relations with Japan and other nonsocialist nations has accelerated its program to develop nuclear weapons.

Because the United States continues to view Korean issues through the prism of the cold war (for example, unification is a "Korean question" to be resolved behind the shield of the American military presence), no real initiatives have been taken to seize the moment. Consequently, the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons in the south, a potential bargaining chip for a redefined military balance on the peninsula, has been given up in order to deter North Korea from

going nuclear. Both the timing and size of an announced reduction of American conventional forces in South Korea, part of "an orderly draw down of American forces in the Pacific," was primarily dictated by *budgetary*, not strategic, considerations and then was halted recently because Kim Il Sung's regime was on the brink of going nuclear. Thus, as elsewhere, the agenda for American policy toward Korea has been set not by strategic initiatives from Washington, but by budgetary criteria and internationally generated crises.

What is to be done, beyond an imaginative, long-term strategic vision giving higher priority to the Pacific and linking the political, security, and economic dimensions of foreign policy? Rather than emphasis on a peace dividend, the stress in Asia should be on the "alliance dividend" owed the United States for 40 years of military and economic involvement in the region. During those decades, most of the East Asian countries registered the highest growth rates in the

world while depending on the United States as their primary export market and living under a conventional and nuclear security umbrella made in America. These countries now have both the capacity and the obligation to pay an alliance dividend to the United States. This could come through a new or reorganized World Bank that would grant concessionary loans (of the sort extended to Asia after World War II) that would permit the United States to redress the distortions to its economy developed over the last 40 years in meeting the military requirements of the cold war. There are of course many impediments to the enactment of such a policy or other policies that point to the future while building on the past. However, it is clear that if the current age of international upheaval is to end in a workable new political economy in Asia, the leadership will not come from Tokyo or a narrowly regional coalition, but rather from a United States leveraging the legitimacy and power carried over from the cold war. ■

Takashi Inoguchi argues that Japan's "efforts to accelerate economic development in East Asia and beyond are not only in Japan's business and national interests, but also part of an attempt to achieve two major objectives: to enhance the welfare of the people in the region and to roll back attempts at regionalization and protectionism. Japan's efforts should not be seen as the formation of a Japan-led regional economic bloc or the pursuit of a hegemonic position in East Asia."

Japan's Foreign Policy in East Asia

BY TAKASHI INOUCHI

Despite the strong continuity of many political arrangements in East Asia at the end of the cold war, many East Asian countries are uncertain about the region's future. It is not quite "a great disorder under heaven," the image often evoked in East Asia during such destabilizing periods as the Vietnam War and the first oil crisis in 1973. Instead, East Asia has also been afflicted by the end-of-the-cold-war syndrome that is most intensely manifested in the Soviet Union's and Yugoslavia's disintegration and the European Community's disarray. The nature of uncertainty is threefold: international security (especially the American component), the global economy, and domestic society.

THE UNDERPINNINGS OF UNCERTAINTY

The United States demonstrated through the Persian Gulf War that it is the only military power able to project massive force abroad. The series of disarmament agreements with Russia and the other former republics of the Soviet Union on strategic and tactical nuclear forces has also demonstrated that the United States holds the upper hand in strategic nuclear forces. Yet America's military superiority, both nuclear and conventional, is not necessarily robust. The Japanese and Europeans are eroding its technological edge, and the technological foundation for advanced weapons has also decayed in many areas such as electronic parts and materials. Furthermore, the American economy has been battered by the federal budget deficit and the foreign trade deficit, and United States manufacturing competitiveness has been steadily undermined by foreign competition. These deficiencies in the bases for United States national security indicate that the United

States might not be able to sustain its current superiority for another half century.

The second element provoking uncertainty is the global economy. Technological progress has made the transmission of information and the transportation of goods increasingly fast and inexpensive. Global economic transactions have thus increased by leaps and bounds. The steady removal of economic regulations in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and other countries in the 1980s and 1990s has made economic transactions far more global than before. It is not farfetched to now say that a world economy has come into full being this decade with these changes and with growing market and trade liberalization.

Yet the global sway of market and trade liberalization has created other kinds of problems. Liberalization means that structural adjustments to a country's economy have to take place intermittently because of changes in comparative advantage; when economic growth is sufficiently high, a country's economy can adapt to structural adjustments with relative ease. If growth is not high, however, the economy can be racked by the pain of bankruptcies and unemployment. Foreign competitors can also make headway more easily in liberalized systems than in others. Voices against further liberalization, with calls for protectionism and regionalism, are then heard more often.

While the process of economic liberalization advanced full swing in the 1980s, its "excesses" have dominated the early 1990s as recession has hit the world. To cope with the problems caused by globalization, some have confined market and trade liberalization to regionally defined spaces while not losing the benefit of liberalization within the region so demarcated. Examples of these are the European Community (EC) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The increasingly dim prospects for the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs

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and Trade—that is, the likely failure of universalist solutions to trade liberalization—has led many countries to ready themselves for more regional arrangements if GATT negotiations do not succeed. Economic globalization has thus also seen economic regionalization. Economic liberalization also has political implications. Economic liberalization and political democratization tend to go hand in hand. Once economic regulations are lifted and once command economies vanish, a transition to a market-oriented economy is usually hazardous since economic life becomes more hectic and foreign competitors take advantage of lowered barriers. Furthermore, calls for democratization tend to be louder than ruling elites would like, since those in power could lose it through “hasty” democratization. All these place many developing and former socialist countries in a difficult situation. The potential for destabilization brought on by domestic liberalization is not insignificant. The former Soviet Union is a good example of how turmoil can be created through half-hearted market liberalization and hasty political liberalization. Others include Algeria, where the military lost power temporarily by holding democratic elections, and Peru, where a democratically elected president resorted to a coup by mobilizing the military. The last quarter of this century has witnessed large-scale political democratization and economic liberalization, which has prompted Francis Fukuyama to call this “the end of History.”¹ Yet with it comes increasing instability in many parts of the world.

The factors provoking uncertainty are evident globally, but they are most visible in East Asia. First, America’s military superiority has been very apparent in the region, and its military and naval presence has been considered the core of East Asia’s stability. Yet America’s increasing vulnerability to competition from East Asia—especially in the areas of advanced civilian and military technology and manufactured goods for export—has become a growing concern in the United States. Second, competition from East Asia (and western Europe) has led the United States to negotiate NAFTA. While global economic liberalization has been under way for some years, drives toward regional trade blocs have been no less strong. Yet East Asia, which wants ever wider global market access, cannot become an exclusive and closed regional market—that would be suicide. Third, East Asian leaders shrewdly recognize the potential for destabilization that political liberalization could bring. This explains why East Asian countries demonstrate strong continuity in their political-economic regimes—and it is why Deng Xiaoping dealt with the Tiananmen Square demonstrators the way he did in 1989.

¹See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

THE STRUCTURE OF JAPAN’S EAST ASIA POLICY

The cold war division of East Asia has begun to disappear, especially from Japan’s viewpoint. How to deal with the uncertainty engendered by the cold war’s end without jeopardizing the peace and prosperity the region has enjoyed has become the central question. For Japan the answer has been to develop a set of policies that encompass multilateralism, a focus on the market, and personnel training.

Three factors—American military dominance, Japan’s historical debt to East Asia, and East Asia’s thirst for global free market access—have led Japan to be cautious in shaping policy. A Japan seeking preeminence is regarded as unwise. Caution and prudence are the key words. It is unwise to move in the direction of challenging American military supremacy. Any new regional arrangements must be multilateral and built around the Japan–United States Security Treaty. Japan’s misconduct in the Pacific before and during World War II pushes the Japanese head low. Moreover, according to a Japanese proverb, the richer one becomes, the lower one’s head must be bent, like a fully grown rice plant. And most important, Japan—and all of East Asia—cannot pursue narrowly defined regional interests at the sacrifice of global free trade regimes. These factors lead Japan to pursue a multilateral path. Thus, unlike the United States, Japan cannot afford to act unilaterally very often. Multilateralism is the best way for Japan to do something meaningful in its self-designated policy areas without receiving feedback that is too negative.

But what about bilateralism? Although an ally of the United States, Japan is ambivalent about pursuing bilateral diplomatic actions with the United States. It is often called a special relationship, but Japan feels more often than not that its arm is twisted by the United States under the façade of “friendly and frank discussions.” Multilateralism places Japan in a slightly different context, allowing it to mobilize support from other countries by propounding a certain set of policy ideas. It allows Japan to be a banner-weaver. Whether Japan wins majority support or not in a multilateral context is not an issue for Japan. When it wins the majority, that is fine. When not, one can bemoan the lack of appreciation shown for the country’s policy initiative.

Two good examples of Japan’s multilateralism are its roles in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference. The ADB is an organization devoted to Asian economic development with Japan and the United States the top two contributors; both provide equal amounts of capital to the bank. Japan has argued recently that given Asia’s demographic size, that the continent has 60 percent of the world’s population (including a very large part of the world’s poorest people), contributions to the ADB should be increased.

Furthermore, Japan argues that official development assistance should help recipient countries build economic infrastructure and boost manufacturing. The United States opposes any scheme that forces it to contribute more to the ADB and argues that official development assistance should enhance areas such as basic human needs and environmental protection, and that grants should be increased and loans reduced. Japan is steadily gaining more support on this issue. Naturally, if the United States does not change its position, nothing formally will take place.

APEC, founded to promote economic cooperation among Asian Pacific countries, is loosely organized and charged with monitoring regional economic activities. The organization encompasses most Asian Pacific countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Russia (which is a semi-member). It was Japan that helped amend the draft for APEC to include the United States and Canada. By so doing Japan is attempting to retain close and inseparable ties between Pacific Asia and North America (especially since the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations do not seem very encouraging when it comes to keeping and enhancing global free trade regimes).

An attempt by the United States and Canada to allow Mexico to join APEC met some opposition from the group's members during this year's annual meeting. Japan has been ambivalent about this, since the Pacific Asian features of APEC would be further diluted if Mexico were allowed to join; most Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries are also not entirely happy about the idea. Yet Japan is not uninterested in letting APEC absorb NAFTA *de facto* into a greater APEC because it would help water down some of the negatives that may develop out of NAFTA.

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is a third example of Japan's role in a multilateral group. Aimed at establishing peace and legitimacy in Cambodia, this UN force will administer the disarmament of all of Cambodia's warring factions and oversee free elections to produce a democratic government. UNTAC is responsible for an enormous number of tasks, including building roads, bridges, ports and airports, policing communities, designing and supervising the elections, and at a later date hopefully helping a democratically elected government run the country.

The head of the UNTAC is a Japanese, Yasushi Akashi. The Japanese government managed to get the United Nations peacekeeping operations approved by the parliament in July 1992, thus enabling the Japanese Self Defense Forces to participate in UNTAC, although its mission is restricted to noncombat and

low-risk tasks. The key aspect of Japanese participation in UNTAC is to help it provide Cambodia with advice and financial assistance.

A POLICY BASED ON THE MARKET

Because it has been constrained from becoming a political and military superpower by the three factors mentioned earlier, Japan's business and foreign policy activities in East Asia are intensely market-centered. Market-centered means that Japan sees market forces as primary and government efforts as secondary in achieving policy objectives. Japan's foreign policy is thus built on foreign trade, foreign direct investment, official development assistance, technology transfers, and other financial flows as well as the domestic economic activities of Japan and the other countries of East Asia. This market orientation is natural for Japan as long as its foreign policy uses economic affluence and manufacturing competitiveness as ways to influence other countries.

While the private sector shines supreme in making decisions in areas such as foreign trade and foreign direct investment, the government still can exercise considerable power in making decisions on, for example, official development assistance. But even in this area the private sector—both business firms in Japan and in recipient countries—wield a surprising degree of power. The Japanese government's main role should be to initiate economic activities and facilitate economic policy interaction by removing barriers (like the Japanese-Chinese agreement on Japan's direct investment in China), and by setting up standards and common rules (like the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications's proposal to standardize telecommunications in East Asia). However, to cope with great uncertainty, one must monitor the markets. Fine-tuning market forces is considered to be one way to minimize losses.²

A third way of coping with uncertainty is to meet with policymakers and managers and offer the lessons Japan has learned from its successful experiences. If certain tenets are shared on money supply or lending policy for example, then policy interactions in East Asia are bound to be easier and possibly more fruitful. Economic bureaucrats in the developing countries of East Asia and the transitioning countries of eastern Europe and Russia could be trained to use elements of the Japanese economic development model (such as the Ministry of Finance's training schemes on fiscal policy, international monetary policy, and tax policy, for example).

By the Japanese economic development model I mean a set of ideas about the Japanese economy's successful development. These could include how self-help is essential to endogenous economic development; how the balance should be struck between competition and cooperation among team workers as

²Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Politics of Interdependence," *Government and Opposition*, vol. 25, no. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 419-437.

well as between firms; how the inculcation of personnel loyalty to the firm is essential for corporate expansion; how a government-business relationship enables each to maneuver sometimes volatile market forces; how the *keiretsu* relationship among firms enables them to establish multiple, long-term contractual relationships without forcing them to worry too much about short-term profits; how developing a manufacturing base is essential to economic development; and how building the economic infrastructure comes first in economic development (and first in government public spending).³ At a time of increasing uncertainty, happiness is seeing like-minded people from abroad.

JAPAN'S EAST ASIAN POLICY IN ACTION

There are three major foreign policy issues Japan must confront in the post-cold war period. The first is retaining the Japan-United States Security Treaty and remolding it into a kind of multilateral regional security organization. Second, sustaining global free trade regimes even if the United States significantly departs from them. Third, raising the income level of the developing and transitioning countries by encouraging economic transactions with Japan-led East Asia yet not destroying relations with the energy- and food-exporting worlds.

The Post-Minister's conference of ASEAN is a major vehicle for fostering the first issue—creating a regional security organization. In 1991 this conference issued a communiqué for the first time that said ASEAN would attempt to deal with regional security issues. However, ASEAN members could not agree on any formulas until China forcibly consolidated its position on one of the Spratly Islands in 1992. After the incident ASEAN issued a communiqué that criticized China and called on ASEAN to work toward peaceful resolution of the issue.

Whether an anti-China policy can become a theme for the construction of a regional security regime is a moot question. The Japanese government wants to include China in any such regime. Japan does not necessarily share the apprehension others have about the menacing implications of a Greater Chinese Eco-

nomic Area comprising 50 million people (the people of Taiwan, Hong Kong and all the ethnic Chinese in the ASEAN countries, plus 1.2 billion in China)—a scheme some Americans want to continue to see grow in order to counterbalance Japan's economic preponderance in East Asia. Excluding China from a regional security regime would hinder its effectiveness. It was Deng Xiaoping who once said rightly that with the Chinese and Japanese fighting again, half of Heaven falls down.⁴

The situation on the Korean Peninsula, which presents a picture of instability, could also be the source of a regional security regime. North Korea's refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct nuclear inspections creates anxiety in East Asia since it could catalyze a destabilizing momentum, especially in Japan. South Korea's political instability coupled with a somewhat less than vigorous economic performance could drive the country to attempt another diplomatic acrobatic act like the Seoul-Moscow and the Seoul-Beijing diplomatic normalizations.

If the rapprochement between Seoul and Beijing eventually leads Pyongyang and Tokyo closer to each other, then it would become a *de facto* cross-recognition scheme. This would lead to a fledgling regional security regime in Northeast Asia involving the United States and Russia as well as China, Japan, and the Koreans.

Cambodia would be the real testing ground for a regional security regime in Southeast Asia. If UNTAC can effectively supervise the democratic election scheduled for early 1993, then it would boost UNTAC and the United Nations in general. It would also be a triumph for Japan's multilateral diplomacy, since Japan has been a major diplomatic and financial actor in the peace process, the United States opting only for lightweight participation. If Cambodia is stabilized, it would herald an era of economic development in that country and in the surrounding region encompassing Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Burma and southern China (Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, Yunnan, and Guangdong).

While a multilateral security regime is important, a global free trade regime is absolutely critical to East Asia. Because of its vast population and its rapidly growing energy and food needs, East Asia must produce high value-added goods and services to earn the foreign reserves to meet these needs. For this to happen, virtually every Pacific Asian country requires a global free trade regime. This is especially true for noncoastal China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and portions of the Philippines and Indonesia, which are at a stage of economic development that now has low energy needs but sooner or later they are bound to join the league of high energy-consuming countries.

Although the gross national product of all of East Asia is projected to reach western Europe's and North America's, East Asia has to seek to increase global

³See for example Okita Saburo, "Contributions should be based on Japanese experiences," *Asahi shimbun* (evening edition), August 19, 1992, p. 9. Many historical and institutional aspects of the Japanese economic development model are comprehensively treated in Takatoshi Ito, *The Japanese Economy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).

⁴Takashi Inoguchi, *Japan's International Relations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 141-152; Takashi Inoguchi, "Lengzhan hou de shijie jixu yu Ri-Zhong guanxi [The Post-Cold War World Order and Japan-China Relations] (Paper presented at the conference commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Japan-China diplomatic normalization, Beijing, September 2-5, 1992).

market access because it needs an ever expanding market to sell its manufactured goods, and because it needs an ever growing supply of energy and food from other regions of the world. East Asia will undoubtedly be a bastion of a global free trade regime even if western Europe backs out and North America backs down on free trade. East Asia cannot afford to take a protectionist-regionalist stance; it will be content with an open and loose regional regime that it will try to extend to other regions of the world such as South Asia and Latin America.

APEC is the group that could serve as the basis for such a free trade regime. It does not intend to form a closed regional bloc. The antithesis to APEC is the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), which was originally proposed by Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahmod Mahathir. The EAEG is intended to be a narrow regional grouping of East Asia that excludes North America and Oceania. Its major purposes are to invigorate regional economic transactions by promoting market liberalization and setting up common standards and to use its organizational solidarity in the face of United States-led market liberalization attempts.

After the original announcement of the EAEG proposal (which was criticized within ASEAN), the East Asian Economic Council (EAEC) came out with a proposal moderating the EAEG formula by emphasizing its compatibility with GATT and APEC. However, since Indonesia, a major power in ASEAN, clearly sides with APEC, the EAEC formula seems to have lost momentum for the time being.

It is important to note a series of efforts within the region to facilitate and enhance economic transactions. Most significant is the mushrooming mini-regionalization around dynamic economic cores like Singapore, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Taipei, Seoul, and Kitakyushu. No less important is a series of efforts between Japan and other East Asian countries for technical cooperation on macro and microeconomic management. Training bureaucrats, engineers, and managers is a key element in this effort. By sharing certain economic management techniques such as the idea of self help, the importance of a long-term relationship between business firms, and a close business-government relationship, a soft institutionalization of a Pacific Asian economy is in the offing, quite apart from the seemingly solid institutionalization scheme propounded by the EAEG. It seems that East Asians are hoping that the East Asian hybrid of these techniques might enable them to alleviate some severe market disturbances without being entirely constrained by extraregional economic forces.

ACCELERATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It is in Japan's interest to enhance the economic development of the developing countries. It should

first start in the Asia Pacific region, since it is the area most directly affected by Japanese dynamism. The region's vast income disparities must be vigorously reduced because it would be mutually beneficial to have economic partners with higher income levels. When it comes to trade and investment, many of the region's countries have not attained the income levels many members of the European Community now enjoy. Japan's task is to encourage and consolidate intraregional economic transactions that have already started to grow.

Aside from middle-income countries like Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Malaysia, much remains to be done in densely populated China, Indochina, and Indonesia as well as in those vast areas with sparse population, such as the Russian Far East, Central Asia, and China's western frontiers of Xingjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, and Mongolia.

Two other regions, South Asia and Latin America, have started to liberalize their highly regulated markets and have registered respectable growth rates as their economic transactions with East Asia have steadily risen. Although South Asia and Latin America are terra incognita to many Japanese businesses, the trend is toward consolidating economic relations with these two regions in hope that the vast income disparity will be offset by long-term market expansion.

The Japanese have a mixed record in eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The oil-exporting countries of the Middle East have had fairly strong economic relations with Japan, especially since the 1973 oil crisis. However, given the general weakness of their economic infrastructures and their political instability, Japan's economic development efforts in the region have not resulted in the remarkable economic performance that has been seen in East Asia.

Africa has been going down steadily and Japan, which has been encouraged to increase grant aid to low-income countries, has been moving toward increasing aid. However, the outlook for sustainable economic development in Africa is poor and has constrained Japan's efforts there.

All the efforts to accelerate economic development in East Asia and beyond are not only in Japan's business and national interests, but also part of an attempt to achieve two major objectives: to enhance the welfare of the people in the region, and to roll back attempts at regionalization and protectionism. Japan's efforts should not be seen as the formation of a Japan-led regional economic bloc or the pursuit of a hegemonic position in East Asia. The latter would be extremely costly for Japan. First, the United States would vigorously oppose it and Japan's position would be difficult to sustain without America's backing or approval. Second, Japan—and East Asia for that matter—would economically stumble in a regional self-enclosure. As has been pointed out, Japan and the

rest of East Asia need global market access for a long time to come.

FOUR FUTURE SCENARIOS

I would like to conclude by examining what I see as the current stage of East Asia's evolution when viewed through four scenarios of the future world order in the next half a century: the Pax Americana Phase Two (United States hegemony slightly modified because of its relative downsizing), the Bi-gemony (the United States and Japan acting together as global managers), the Pax Nipponica (Japan's global supremacy), and the Pax Consortis (the scenario of an issue-oriented coalition managing the globe).⁵

I must stress that time is an important dimension here. In order to see systemic transformations, one must observe a quarter century or two at least. Despite the end of the cold war (these scenarios were first presented in 1988), not much has changed in the last four years that would fundamentally alter them. Also, the four scenarios focus on Japan–United States relations with relatively little treatment of Europe, including the former Soviet Union. Since 1988 Europe has been embroiled in its own processes of agonizing change, and preoccupied with itself and its possible evolution into a self-enclosed region.

For these reasons my assessment of global evolution is not very different from my 1988 assessment. All the more so for my assessment of the East Asian evolution. East Asia has been lightly affected by the end of the cold war. First, United States military supremacy is now most evident in East Asia. Its continuous military presence, if it is somewhat scaled down, is, according to a widely shared view, the key to regional stability. While regional rivalries have become more evident, the only credible country to assure stability is the United States.

Second, Japan's steady economic ascendance in East Asia does not seem to be derived from some determined drive for regional hegemony, as can be seen in the pattern of Japan's trade and direct investment in the region.⁶ And more important, it has not been matched by other elements considered to be indispensable requirements for a responsible global power such as military preparedness and political leadership.

⁵Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Four Scenarios for the Future," *International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Winter 1988–1989), pp. 15–28.

⁶Martin Feldstein, "National Security Aspects of US-Japan Economic Relations in the Pacific Asia Region," in Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler, eds., *The United States and Japan in Pacific Asia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).

⁷Patrick Tyler, "Pentagon's New World Order: US to Reign Supreme," *International Herald Tribune*, March 9, 1992, p. 1.

The power configuration in East Asia in the wake of the end of the cold war has thus not changed fundamentally and the Pax Americana Phase Two continues despite the onset of its process of decline—a process that could take as long as 300 years, as was the case with the Roman Empire. While Japan's economic ascendance is increasingly clear and while Russia's political and economic difficulties have stifled its foreign policy, American military supremacy—and its will to retain it in East Asia as well as the rest of the globe—has not been fundamentally modified, as was seen in the leaked draft of a United States Defense Department document on its defense posture in 1992.⁷

To say that the Pax Americana Phase Two continues does not mean that other scenarios have become unrealistic as a result. Instead, the opposite is true. The bi-gemony scenario seems to have gained more credence as the United States position in East Asia has become increasingly unsustainable without Japan's supporting role adequately developed. While China may find this scenario of a bi-gemonic domination manifestly objectionable, ASEAN may find it a lesser evil as long as it would not become an oppressive one. The Pax Nipponica scenario has also gained feasibility as far as its economic component is concerned. But the overall position of Japan does not lend it any credibility. For example, Japan's share of global foreign trade is slightly more than 10 percent, a share far from enabling it to significantly shape or destroy free trade regimes. If it comes to military preparedness for and political leadership on global security roles, the scenario pales immediately, as was demonstrated during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The Pax Consortis scenario seems to have gained feasibility now that the United States has recognized the need to obtain approval and support from far more countries than was necessary during the cold war, and since multilateralism is gaining influence as the UN and other international institutions are reasserting themselves in areas such as peacekeeping, refugee relocation, the global environment, arms control, and human rights; this reassertion also holds true for many international economic institutions.

Given this assessment, it is clear that Japan's foreign policy in East Asia conforms with the general assessment of the Pax Americana Phase Two. And Japan's increasingly visible policy actions in East Asia result from its attempt to cope with the future's growing uncertainty and the steady rise of its self-assertiveness within the framework of the Pax Americana Phase Two. Whether Japan's foreign policy might accelerate a transition from the Pax Americana Phase Two to another, unknown scenario is something that only time can tell. ■

Cambodia's genocidal misery under Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge ended with the Vietnamese invasion of 1979, but the country has continued to experience guerrilla warfare and the problems of the Khmer Rouge since then. This year saw a concerted effort on the part of the UN to implement a peace in the country. But as Craig Etcheson notes, it is a peace that could turn "red hot."

The "Peace" in Cambodia

BY CRAIG ETCHESON

Peace came to Cambodia this year. The country suffered through a brutal civil war from 1970 to 1975, followed by four years of Khmer Rouge government that led to the disappearance of 20 percent of the Cambodian population, including the entire ethnic Vietnamese population of more than 500,000 people. In 1979, after years of patient diplomacy had failed to end repeated military attacks by the Cambodian government on southern Vietnam, Hanoi invaded and overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime. Under President Jimmy Carter, the United States quickly backed China's and the Association of South-east Asian Nations' policy of sponsoring the ousted Khmer Rouge and their allies. The administration of President Ronald Reagan expanded American support of the Khmer Rouge coalition as it fought a guerrilla war against the government backed by Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and under President George Bush the United States continued down this path. Thus the conflict in Cambodia was both civil and international, with proxy armies supported by all three sides of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle.

Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia in 1989. The collapse of the eastern bloc that same year combined with the Soviet withdrawal from the third world the next year stripped the Cambodian government of external sponsorship, forcing it to accept a UN-brokered settlement with the Khmer Rouge and two

other guerrilla armies. In October 1991 a peace agreement was signed.

Yet throughout 1992 land mines were planted in Cambodia faster than they were removed, giving the country the highest rate of amputees in the world. The Khmer Rouge escalated its military aggression, sometimes attacking in battalion strength with the support of heavy armor. The number of people "internally displaced" by the fighting now approaches 200,000 and the death toll steadily rises. Only in a country that has known more than 20 years of war could this be called peace.

THE UNEASY PEACE AGREEMENT

On October 23, 1991, in Paris, 10 years of labyrinthine regional and international negotiations finally yielded a peace plan intended to end the fighting in Cambodia. The three guerrilla movements led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former Prime Minister Son Sann, and Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot also gave their solemn assent to the pact. The settlement committed the UN to the most expensive, complex, and interventionist peacekeeping mission in its history.

The settlement covers an astonishing range of issues, from refugee repatriation and human rights to electoral arrangements and the economy. The key elements of the plan include a cease-fire by all combatants and cessation of outside military assistance to the warring parties; the formation of a Supreme National Council made up of representatives from the Cambodian government and the three guerrilla movements; occupation of Cambodia by nearly 22,000 UN personnel; repatriation and resettlement of 360,000 refugees from camps in Thailand; the disarming of 70 percent of the estimated 200,000 fighters in Cambodia and their reintegration into civilian life; control of all critical state ministries by UN administrators; the holding of UN-organized elections by May 1993; and the reconstruction of the country's utterly destroyed economy. This unprecedented UN intervention will cost nearly \$3 billion,¹ and is rivaled in size only by the 19,828

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¹The overall costs of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict include an estimated \$1.9 billion for the UN peacekeeping operation, more than \$100 million for the refugee repatriation, and some \$880 million for the reconstruction of Cambodia's economy.

UN peacekeepers sent to the Congo in the early 1960s. (It is perhaps chastening to recall that 234 UN personnel died in the Congo, including UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.)

Cambodia's Supreme National Council, which is composed of two representatives from each of the three guerrilla groups, and six representatives from the government, officially convened two days after the settlement was signed. The SNC, which is under the chairmanship of Prince Sihanouk, is a diplomatic fiction, designed to symbolically "embody Cambodian sovereignty" while exercising little practical power. Its first session was devoted to deciding that each representative would be permitted 3 armed bodyguards, plus another 10 bodyguards for each delegation headquarters. As the "peace" progressed, the bodyguards would prove to be a necessary precaution.

INTO THE BREACH

The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) arrived in Phnom Penh in early November 1991 under the leadership of diplomat Ataul Karin and Brigadier General Jean-Michel Loridon. Their task was to liaison with the government and guerrilla authorities, enforce the cease-fire, and collect information necessary for deployment of the full peacekeeping force. On November 14, the exiled Sihanouk returned to Cambodia and was immediately proclaimed head of state by Prime Minister Hun Sen, symbolically ending 12 years of warfare between the two leaders.

Despite an improving political situation, however, the difficulties for the mission immediately became apparent. By mid-November UNAMIC officials estimated that 4 million land mines had been planted indiscriminately throughout Cambodia. More serious problems soon made their appearance: the Khmer Rouge refused mission members access to their zones, a requirement in order to plan for the demobilization. The battlefield cease-fire, shakily observed for almost a year, was decisively broken this January 5 when the Khmer Rouge attacked government-held Kompong Thom province. With a mandate as peacekeepers, UNAMIC was helpless in the face of determined combat. The Khmer Rouge force, known as the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), quickly took 20 villages and created more than 10,000 new refugees. The NADK remains the best-armed force in Cambodia, with an array of Chinese-made heavy artillery and tanks and small arms from across the Western world.

As their offensive gained momentum during the third week of January, the newly appointed chief of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Yasushi Akashi, arrived in Cambodia for a fact-finding mission. Akashi lodged the UN's first formal complaint against the Khmer Rouge, accusing it of breaching the peace agreement by denying UNAMIC personnel ac-

cess to its zones. The Khmer Rouge's reply was to escalate its military offensive. In February, Khmer Rouge General Nuon Bun No opened a new political front, accusing UNAMIC of "abuses of privileges and immunities," and insisting there would be no Khmer Rouge cooperation with UN forces until UNTAC was fully deployed. As if to underline their pique, on February 26 Khmer Rouge troops opened fire on a UN helicopter, wounding the commander of the Australian UNAMIC contingent. It would be the first of many such incidents.

UNTAC began in earnest on February 28 when the UN Security Council authorized a revised plan submitted by Akashi. Among other changes, Akashi decided that rather than demobilizing 70 percent of the Cambodian combatant forces, fully 100 percent of the fighters—including government forces—should be disarmed. When asked how the factions might react to this eleventh-hour change, a UN official answered, "What choice do they have?"

On March 15 Akashi arrived in Phnom Penh to assume command of the peacekeeping operation along with the first contingent of UNTAC blue berets under the command of an Australian officer, Lieutenant General John Sanderson. Like UNAMIC, Sanderson's UN army is not authorized to fight. Throughout March and April, the Khmer Rouge pressed its offensive in Kompong Thom province, attempting to secure two strategic roads. By May these strikes had escalated to battalion-strength attacks. Continuing disregard for the cease-fire, UN officials explained, merely represented Khmer Rouge efforts to improve their tactical position before the anticipated beginning of the disarmament process in June.

The Paris settlement commits the four Cambodian parties to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In order to impress on the parties the importance of the human rights provisions in the peace accords, UNTAC asked the four factions to sign two additional agreements—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—which define in greater detail those rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration. On April 20, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali attended the signing of these two covenants by the four Cambodian parties. Boutros-Ghali said he hoped that Cambodia would "overcome the serious mistakes of the past," a clear reference to the behavior of the Khmer Rouge. Responding to these concerns, Khmer Rouge military chief of staff Son Sen assured the secretary general that he "would see results in the next few days."

Eight days later, several boatloads of Khmer Rouge soldiers stole into the fishing village of Kok Kandal carrying AK-47 assault rifles and rocket launchers. They killed seven unarmed civilians in their homes, all ethnic Vietnamese fishermen. This demonstration of

human rights, Khmer Rouge-style, set a pattern that has continued throughout 1992.

The Khmer Rouge also flouted the critical June start of military disarmament by refusing to participate. Nervous UN officials continued to insist the Khmer Rouge was simply "positioning" itself. Indeed, the Khmer Rouge was positioning itself; as the rival Cambodian government army gathered at cantonment sites and surrendered its weapons to the UN, Khmer Rouge forces attacked the disarmed soldiers. As June became July and increasing diplomatic pressure on the Khmer Rouge had no effect on its position, it began to dawn on even the dimmest of politicians and bureaucrats that the Khmer Rouge plays by a different set of rules. All during July the UN Security Council labored mightily, finally bringing forth a mouse of a sanction on July 21: the Khmer Rouge would be denied tens of millions of dollars in development funding if it continued to engage in military actions in Cambodia and refused to disarm. Apparently lost on the Security Council was the fact that the Khmer Rouge does not believe in the concept of "development funding," but rather is committed to building an autarkic, agrarian, peasant-based economy. It was beginning to look like the Khmer Rouge had a superior understanding of power politics, if not of ethics.

UNDERMINING REPATRIATION

Perhaps the most tragic legacy of the Cambodian conflict has been the 360,000 Cambodian refugees in Thailand and another 180,000 internally displaced people. Some of these people fled in 1979 from the fighting between the invading Vietnamese army and the retreating Khmer Rouge. But a larger percentage was rounded up by the Khmer Rouge and forced to march out of Cambodia in a perverse application of Mao's dictum that a guerrilla army needs to have a population among whom it can be as the fish is to the water. Those in the refugee camps have been the pawns of the struggle in every sense of the word: they have been forced by the guerrilla armies to be soldiers and battlefield porters.

As part of the peace agreement, the refugees were to be repatriated in time to resettle and participate in the elections. The repatriation plan envisioned the return of 8,500 to 10,000 people a week beginning in March, with everyone home by this December. The refugees were to be processed through UN-administered reception centers in Cambodia, and each family provided with two hectares of mine-free arable land in a location of their choice. In addition, each family would receive tools, seed for rice planting, materials for home-building, and provisions for 18 months.

Obstacles immediately arose. The worst was land mines: their impact had been grossly underestimated. Simply clearing transit routes proved to be a herculean task, requiring far more time than expected. Beyond

the roads, Cambodia is honeycombed with land mines in the jungles, in the forests, and in the fields. Ten months after the signing of the peace accords, only 25,000 had been disarmed. Estimates of the total number planted range from 2 million to 6 million; between 40 to 50 civilians are killed each month by mines and many more are permanently disabled. At the current rate of removal, it will take between 66 years (for 2 million mines) and 200 years (for 6 million mines) before Cambodian civilians are safe from them.

There were other problems with the repatriation. A majority of the returnees wished to relocate to provinces near the Thai border—close to sanctuary should the need to flee arise again—but there was not enough land in these areas (in fact, the first 5,000 returning families exhausted the supply of mine-free farmland). Another set of obstacles was raised by the guerrilla organizations; each faction wanted as many of the refugees as possible to relocate into its "liberated zones," the better to influence the upcoming elections. In April, arsonists hoping to encourage refugees to forsake the UN and move directly to faction-controlled zones set fires in Site 2, the largest of the Thai camps, destroying 1,500 homes.

Recognizing the impossibility of carrying out its plan, in May the UN developed alternative options. There were four basic choices: wait in the camps for farmland to become available; accept land for a house only; accept money only (\$50 per adult and \$25 per child); or accept tools only. The UN also said that those who wanted to go to Phnom Penh would get food only, as would those who could find relatives to take them in.

For those who wish to return to farming, there is no prospect that land will be made available anytime soon. This greatly displeases the Thais; having extended their hospitality to the Cambodians for more than a decade, they are anxious to close the camps.

Measures taken by the UN to free the refugees from factional control have been ingenious and heroic. But the refugees live with the well-founded fear that the guerrillas know who they are and who their families are, and that they can and will exact retribution for "disloyalty" when the UN is not looking. In the first six months of the year, the Thai government constructed seven new roads leading from the border camps directly into the guerrilla zones. The UN reluctantly acquiesced in the construction of new "processing" centers controlled by the factions rather than by the UN at the ends of these roads. Thus the refugee advocates' long-standing fear that many refugees will not have the opportunity to freely choose their new homes has been realized.

By the end of July only 50,000 refugees had been repatriated—an average return rate of about 3,000 per week and only one-third that required to complete the repatriation in time for the elections. As a result of

increasing Thai pressure to end the refugee problem—at least in Thailand—during August the weekly rate accelerated to 10,000, far outstripping the capacity of the UN to provide food, shelter, and health services. Returnees found themselves shivering in the monsoon mud under blue plastic lean-tos. Thai determination to finish the job quickly; lack of food, housing, and health services; the absence of additional mine-free farmland; guerrilla pressure; poor health conditions in the resettlement areas; and the hostility shown by some villagers toward the returnees—combined to make life miserable for the subjects of the repatriation plan, and to create a negative example for future refugee repatriation programs.

KHMER ROUGE AGGRESSIVENESS

The Khmer Rouge apparently never intended to honor the Paris agreements. During the UN advance mission, the Khmer Rouge insisted it was waiting for the deployment of UNTAC before it would cooperate in the peace process. When the peacekeepers arrived, the Khmer Rouge declared it required assurances from the UN that all Vietnamese troops had indeed left Cambodia in 1989. Feeling some frustration, UNTAC said there was no evidence that Vietnamese troops remained. The response was to raise a new demand: the government would have to be completely dismantled before the Khmer Rouge disarmed. By this time, the tightly integrated plan for disarmament and election preparations was compromised, and the rainy season had begun.

The Khmer Rouge strategy is obvious. Relying on secrecy and deception, as it has since its inception in 1960, the group successfully eludes virtually all UN monitoring of its zones and has foiled plans to demobilize its military forces according to schedule. While UN civilian administrators had seized control of the government Ministry of Defense, UNTAC still had no idea where Khmer Rouge military headquarters was located. This allowed the Communist guerrillas an entire monsoon season's worth of new jungle growth to better conceal their weapons caches, prepare their military and political cadre for political action in the upcoming elections, and avoid the loss of control over their civilians the other three parties to the peace accords have experienced.² With an eleventh-hour concession to the peace process in October—the symbolic demobilization of a few guerrilla battalions—the Khmer Rouge retains its main forces and the bulk of

its armaments in mountain strongholds while preserving the right to compete in the political process. Whether the Khmer Rouge chooses to boycott the elections, or the UN decides to bar it from the elections, or the Khmer Rouge participates legally, it will retain its historic strengths—coercive capability and strategic cunning.

THE FICTION OF FOUR FACTIONS

Since 1979 Cambodian politics has been in the hands of four factions. These four are the Phnom Penh government and three guerrilla movements that came together in 1982 to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The coalition was constituted, first and foremost, by the rump of the army³ and administrative apparatus of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge. The second component of the coalition was Prince Sihanouk's National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, known by its French acronym, FUNCINPEC. Rounding out the government coalition was Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF).

Discussion of Cambodian politics in terms of these four groupings has always been a diplomatic and journalistic convenience, meant to sketch the outlines of a complex amalgam of actors. Over the course of 1992 this shorthand description became entirely obsolete. Son Sann's KPNLF has split into at least two and possibly as many as four distinct factions, including Son's Buddhist Liberal Democratic party and former republican General Sak Sutsakhan's Liberal Democratic party. Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC is little more than a fiction; Sihanouk himself is recognized by all parties as the head of state, while his children and extended retinue have split along these lines. Prime Minister Hun Sen presides over a disintegrating government as functionaries of the state apparatus position themselves for the planned elections and the reconstitution of the government. Within the government, ideological divisions between liberal democratic socialists and hardcore Marxist-Leninists have become ever more evident. Only the Khmer Rouge has preserved coherence as a political and military entity, providing a superior base for its continuing efforts to return to a position of undisputed power.

Thus the success of the UN peace process in Cambodia is far from assured, given that the goal is more than the cynical removal of the issue from the international agenda. The UN has invested its newfound prestige in the success of its unprecedented Cambodian intervention. The outcome of the peace process is therefore a key indicator of what the phrase "new world order" means in practice. The settlement of the Cambodian conflict has been guided by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Among them, Britain and Russia have been bystanders

²For an analysis of Khmer Rouge strategic use of secrecy and deception, see chapters 5, 6, and 7 of the author's *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984) and his "The Khmer Way of Exile: Lessons from Three Indochinese Wars," chapter 6 in Yossi Shain, ed., *Governments in Exile in Contemporary World Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

with no vital interests at stake. France has its lost imperial pride and a colonial connection to former possessions in Indochina. Since it became clear that the Khmer Rouge planned to abuse the process at every opportunity, France has been lobbying for firm action to force its compliance or, failing that, to render the group irrelevant to Cambodia's future. Yet the French have had relatively little influence on the process.

The Chinese and the Americans are the key players. China seeks redemption from the international ostracism that followed the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, while the ancient imperial interest of regional hegemony exerts a powerful influence on policy. Consequently, China has made a major show in the media of applying pressure to gain Khmer Rouge compliance with the peace process, although it provides no hard evidence of change in its long-standing policy of supporting the Khmer Rouge. The United States has been solicitous of Chinese views on this issue. Since 1979 its stated policy has consistently deplored the prospect of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. Yet the United States provided military, diplomatic, economic, and political support to the rebel coalition, greatly assisting the Khmer Rouge in its effort to survive. Judged by their rhetoric alone, the Chinese and the Americans seem to place the highest value on peace and democracy for Cambodia; judged by their behavior, the record is open to less charitable interpretations. If they fail to pass this "great moral test," as then-United States Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger called it at an international aid conference in Tokyo this year, history will judge the architects of the new world order harshly.³

WILL PEACE BRING AN END TO WAR?

War ravaged Cambodia for nearly a quarter-century because there was always someone who thought war

was preferable to the alternative. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge believed war was better than the continuation of a society in which traditional elites dominated and exploited the peasants in the service of foreign masters. The Vietnamese thought war was better than enduring additional savage military attacks across their southwestern border—but that border is now secure. The Thais believed continued war was preferable to having the army of their traditional Vietnamese rivals along the Cambodian border—but that army is now gone. The Chinese thought war was better than permitting the rise of a challenger to traditional Chinese hegemony in Indochina—but now that Vietnamese challenger has dispatched emissaries to the Forbidden City bearing gifts. The Americans found war more bearable than allowing the consolidation of another Soviet client state in Asia—but now there is no such thing as a "Soviet client state." Thus the geopolitical dynamics driving the Cambodian conflict have collapsed, and with their collapse the possibility of peace has finally come to Cambodia.

All that remains of the grievances and ambitions that sustained a generation of tragedy in Cambodia is Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. There are two schools of thought about what to expect now. One looks to the future and argues that with the cold war's end, the Khmer Rouge are no more than fanatics without a cause. This school believes the Khmer Rouge poses no significant threat to Cambodia's dawning era of peace and development. A second school looks to Cambodian history and suggests that the Khmer Rouge has been underestimated before. According to this second view, the Khmer Rouge has positioned itself well: it survived and grew stronger during 13 years in exile; China remains willing to provide ideological succor; ample funding has been made available by the Khmer Rouge's business partners in the Thai military, who control the border between the two countries; the Western powers are ultimately unconcerned with what happens inside Cambodia; and within the country, the Khmer Rouge skillfully exploits growing tensions as uneven development favoring urbanites over the rural peasantry accelerates and the ethnic stresses of a multicultural society begin to fill the political space being opened by the UN process. The coming year will do much to reveal which of these outcomes will be Cambodia's future—and whether the cool breezes of peace will blow, or whether the peace will turn red hot. ■

³The conference was held to raise funds for one of the most ambitious aspects of the Paris agreement: rebuilding Cambodia's economic infrastructure. The country's economy was completely destroyed by the Khmer Rouge regime in the late 1970s and by a 12-year Western trade and aid embargo which did not end until early this year. The 31 nations that attended the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia that convened in Tokyo June 20-22 pledged \$880 million, well over the \$595 million requested by Boutros-Ghali. The United States promised a contribution of \$135 million over two years, some of which had already been appropriated for repair of roads and "community development" in rebel areas.

This May more than 50 Thais demonstrating against the military-controlled government were killed by troops in Bangkok. The killings put the country on a course of political change that culminated in the September elections and the naming of "the first Thai prime minister who had neither served in the armed forces nor had any links with the aristocracy. Could this be the start of a new pattern of Thai politics?"

Thailand's Return to Democracy

BY JOSEPH J. WRIGHT, JR.

Seventeen coups in 60 years. Fifteen since the end of World War II—an average of one about every third year. And when elections were held, they were always either rigged or hopelessly inconclusive.

This was the "vicious circle" politics in Thailand had run since the country's adoption of a parliamentary system in 1932, when a bloodless coup ended centuries of absolute monarchy in the name of progress and democracy. It took two generations, however, before the Thai masses became aware of their role in this "democratic" society. For until very recently, politics in Thailand was the exclusive domain of wealthy elites, shrewd bureaucrats, and—most important—military strongmen.

No wonder the sixtieth anniversary of the first modern Thai coup went unheralded this year, falling as it did a month after the massacre in May of scores of pro-democracy demonstrators in Bangkok and the forced resignation of the man responsible, Prime Minister Suchinda Kraprayoon, who had led Thailand's most recent bloodless coup, in February 1991.

In the late 1980s, the vicious circle had seemed to be grinding to a halt. As the cold war wound down and Thailand's newly industrialized economy began growing by leaps and bounds, an expanding middle class—better educated and more political than their peasant forebears—came to expect a greater say in government and less interference from the military. The miserable failure of coup attempts in April 1981 and September 1985 suggested that although army types still believed it their right and duty to ride herd over civilian politicians, top generals with vested economic interests now viewed military interference less as a guarantee

and more as a threat to the political stability foreign investors look for. Indeed, by 1988 coups had been declared obsolete, and the army commander in chief, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, had vowed there would be no more.

Thus the 1991 coup came as a shock to all but the most jaded observers. Even more surprising was the massive popular dissent the coup's leaders faced; though initially applauded for having displaced a corrupt civilian regime, the coup makers eventually revealed their self-serving motives and drew the ire of thinking people all over Thailand.

BEST LAID PLANS...

Political insiders in Bangkok believe that last year's coup marked the culmination of a decades-old dream shared by a clique of career men who graduated from the Chulachomklao Military Academy in 1958. A story has it that class president Suchinda Kraprayoon—a poor but intelligent boy who once thought of becoming a doctor and who after a year of medical school was convinced by friends that an army commission was a surer route to wealth, power, and status—envisioned a day when he and certain classmates would occupy the separate posts of supreme commander, commander in chief, and prime minister.¹

Suchinda married into the Thai elite, wedding the sister of classmate Issarapong Noonpakdee and thus cementing a bond with a prominent family that helped him socially and that profited in turn from his meteoric rise through the ranks of the military. Over the years the brothers-in-law advanced together (along with their close friend in the air force, Kaset Rojananil), and by the late 1980s they found themselves within a few short steps of realizing their goal. Their commander in chief, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (class of 1954), was the only obstacle in their path.

When Chavalit became army chief in 1986, he helped implement policies of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond that were designed to curtail the influence of power-hungry army officers by breaking up cliques

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¹Pratya Sawetvimon, "After the Night of the Generals," *Asiaweek*, July 31, 1992, p.70.

and dividing the commands of important units among various academy graduating classes. By 1988 that policy made it possible for Prem, who seemed bent on being the last of the army "strongmen," to retire and turn over the prime minister's office to an elected civilian—the first such transfer in many years.

After Prem stepped down, however, and seeing his own best chance to become prime minister, Chavalit reversed the clique-busting policy and sought to empower himself by consolidating army control under his class of 1958 protégés. In 1989 and 1990 Chavalit promoted Suchinda and Issarapong and gave choice assignments to their classmates. But once Suchinda had risen to deputy army commander, there was no place higher for him to go until Chavalit's retirement, scheduled for three years later. It was then that Suchinda's classmates began encouraging Chavalit to make his move, promising him their continued loyalty should he accept early retirement from the army to join the civilian government or run for office.

Trusting Suchinda, Chavalit retired in March 1990 to become minister of defense under civilian Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Suchinda succeeded Chavalit as commander in chief, with Issarapong becoming deputy army chief and Kaset top man at the air force. Unfortunately for Chavalit, however, Chatichai's corruption-ridden cabinet proved hostile to him. After barely 10 weeks in office he resigned in a huff, the constant rows with fellow cabinet ministers proving too humiliating to endure.

Chavalit next set out to form his own political party. Relying on his vast personal fortune and his good standing in rural areas where he once waged a successful "hearts and minds" campaign against Communist insurgents, he began to press for an early opportunity to challenge Chatichai at the polls. Meanwhile, Suchinda and company pressured Chatichai to clean up his cabinet, and Chatichai attempted to counter them by stacking the ministry of defense with officers and former officers from rival classes and cliques.

Thus the coup of February 23, 1991, was seen by some as a move by the army to facilitate Chavalit's quest for the prime ministership. Suchinda's promise to restore democracy and hold elections seemed tailor-made to give his erstwhile mentor and his New Aspiration party the opportunity to achieve Chavalit's fondest goal. It was not long, however, before it became apparent that Suchinda's own 40-year-old dream would take precedence and that Chavalit was to be left out of the class of 1958's plans.

A SURPRISING YEAR

Chatichai was placed under house arrest on nebulous corruption charges, and his cabinet disbanded. Parliament was also dissolved and the 1978 constitution—the most enduring and widely accepted charter in Thailand's post-World War II history—was abro-

gated. The coup group designated itself the National Peacekeeping Council and, to show its good intentions, installed a civilian prime minister to serve under the military's watchful eye. An appointed cabinet and legislature then began drafting yet another constitution.

Suchinda swore repeatedly that he had no desire to become prime minister; he also pledged that the ruling council would relinquish power to an elected government within the year. Such was the public's disgust with the ousted Chatichai that the coup received broad approval and Suchinda's assurances were accepted at face value for some time before popular suspicion of his motives emerged. Meanwhile Thailand enjoyed one of its best years in living memory.

The appointed prime minister—former diplomat and respected business leader Anand Panyarachun—surprised everyone with his activism and autonomy. Under Anand, more than 100 new laws were passed covering a wide range of crucial reforms that encouraged greater foreign investment and economic expansion. Tax and tariff structures were liberalized, kickbacks and payoffs were reduced in national public works projects, investment restrictions were eased or eliminated, and a trend toward decentralization was set, allowing provinces and villages to take control of revenue once strictly parceled out by Bangkok ministries.

Beyond its show of economic wisdom, the interim government was even more remarkable for its positive example of how a civilian government could function. Though the ruling council reserved veto powers over Anand, the temporary prime minister's acceptance by the international community and support from the business sector made it difficult for the junta to manipulate him. Anand had taken the job with great reservations, and knowing how badly coup leaders needed his good name to bolster their standing abroad, the junta could not risk his resignation. Its members therefore grudgingly allowed the prime minister the autonomy he demanded, deferring to him on his choice of cabinet ministers and acquiescing even as he denied their requests for increases in the military budget.

Anand's prestige and leverage over the military quickly soared, enabling him to pressure the ruling council to lift martial law. That done, political activity leading up to parliamentary elections could begin. Suchinda and his classmates concealed their frustration and bided their time. While ex-General Chavalit built up his New Aspiration party and cautioned against the ruling council's secret ambitions, Suchinda's supporters busied themselves founding a party of their own. Former members of parliament, all considered favorites in the coming balloting, were lured into the ranks of the military-backed Samakhi Tham party, tempted by its swollen campaign chest and the power-

ful patronage it enjoyed from air force chief Kaset Rojananil.

DEMOCRATIC HOPES, MILITARY CRACKDOWN

In late 1991, as the ruling council tinkered with the draft of Thailand's latest "permanent" constitution, Chavalit's New Aspiration party joined forces with other, more established parties known for their dedicated stand against military interference in politics. Along with the Democrat party (headed by veteran parliamentarian Chuan Leekpai) and the newer Palang Dharma party (under Bangkok's two-term elected governor, retired Major General Chamlong Srimuang), New Aspiration spurred a mass public campaign to force changes in the junta-approved charter.

As 1991 drew to a close Bangkok saw its largest mass demonstrations ever as citizens from all walks of life and from around the country came together to demand revisions in the charter and guarantees against a return to military rule. The confrontation reached near-crisis proportions until the country's revered constitutional monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who usually remains neutral on matters of state, came out in favor of accommodation, appealing publicly to both sides for a peaceful solution. The junta caved in on several charter provisions, and with the understanding that once elected the new parliament could reconsider the document, pro-democracy forces made counter concessions.

Under Anand's supervision, the elections that took place March 22, 1992, were the most scrupulously monitored in Thailand's history. Even so, the long-established custom of vote buying proved hard to curb, especially in the impoverished hinterland, where peasant farmers have always looked forward to polling times as a chance to acquire badly needed cash. When the final count was in, pro-military parties had a majority. A five-party coalition with Samakhi Tham at its core emerged holding a slim but certain margin in parliament over the pro-democracy opposition.

A drug charge scandal scuttled efforts to make the Samakhi Tham's civilian figurehead the prime minister, and after two weeks spent searching for a more acceptable candidate, leaders of the coalition's five parties prevailed on General Suchinda to abandon his oft-repeated pledge to remain aloof from politics and heed the call to glory. The army chief made a great show of inner torment, even shedding tears during a nationally televised address, but patriotic duty required him to become prime minister after all, he explained. His audience was not generally impressed. But the dream had been realized.

Forced by the amended constitution to resign his commission before taking over as prime minister, Suchinda transferred command of the army to his wife's brother, General Issarapong Noonpakdee, and made air force chief Marshal Kaset supreme com-

mander of the armed forces. The ruling council was then dissolved, but the junta's hard core retained its de facto control over both state and military, and for the first time in nearly a decade a unified bloc of officers commanded all the most important posts in the army and the government. It seemed as though Suchinda and friends were in for good.

Critics instantly cried foul, and branded the general a liar for breaking his promise to stay out of politics, but the worst came when Suchinda announced his cabinet. The lineup included many of the corrupt ministers who had served under Chatichai, even some whom a National Peacekeeping Council ethics committee had found to be "unusually rich"—a Thai euphemism for "on the take." Plainly the 1991 coup had accomplished nothing in the way of removing the corrupt officials its plotters had claimed to oppose. Effectively thumbing his nose at his detractors, Suchinda now expressed confidence that nothing could be done against him. He had been legally appointed prime minister with majority support in the elected legislature. Thanks to his handpicked Senate he could survive any no-confidence bid in parliament. And no threat of a counter coup could be raised since he controlled the military completely.

Nevertheless Suchinda did not go unchallenged. Within a week of his appointment, the independent Campaign for Popular Democracy called on members of parliament to demonstrate their opposition to the new prime minister by wearing black at the April 16 opening session of the House of Representatives. Most opposition members complied, as did all 41 representatives from Chamlong Srimuang's Palang Dharma party, who embroidered on their black shirts two verses from Buddhist scriptures: "There is no liar who does not sin," and "Better to die than break one's word."

Chamlong, known as "Mr. Clean" for his incorruptibility and Buddhist asceticism, soon became the focus of Suchinda's opposition, both in parliament and outside it. A strict vegetarian and avowed celibate, Chamlong set a lofty standard for both personal and political behavior. As head of the only party to openly reject the tradition of vote buying, he proved in the March elections that an honest campaign could be successful in Thailand. Having captured the lion's share of seats in Bangkok and a significant bloc of votes in the House, Chamlong now set about to capture the nation's imagination and rally the people against Suchinda. On May 4 he announced he would undertake a Gandhi-like fast to last until either Suchinda stepped down in favor of an elected prime minister or he himself died.

The real possibility of Chamlong martyring himself galvanized the opposition and rattled Suchinda. Two days later tens of thousands of Chamlong supporters held a vigil outside the parliament building as Su-

chinda tried to deliver his first policy address. Opposition members walked out en masse, returning only after the speech was over to tear Suchinda apart verbally and demand his resignation. The crowd outside parliament moved to Sanam Luang, the large grassy field by the Grand Palace, where they would be less vulnerable to any attempt to disperse them. It was estimated that the demonstrators numbered as many as 150,000.

The government now lost some of its arrogance, and coalition leaders offered a compromise in the form of constitutional amendments requiring that the next prime minister be an elected member of parliament and limiting the Senate's power to shield Suchinda from no-confidence bids. Chamlong was thus persuaded to suspend his fast and call off the demonstrations, but within days of doing this key figures in the ruling parties disavowed the compromise accord. An angry multitude gathered at Sanam Luang the following Sunday, May 17; that night 150,000 people began a march to the prime minister's office, with Chamlong in the lead.

The demonstrators who took over the streets of Bangkok in the May 1992 and November 1991 protests have been called the "yuppie mob"; indeed, a surprising number of middle- and upper-income citizens of Bangkok figured prominently among the demonstrators. Skipping work or closing up shop to attend the ongoing vigils outside parliament, they kept friends and relatives informed of their whereabouts by mobile phone and fortified themselves with yogurt and bottled water. Unlike during the last mass demonstrations against military rule, which occurred from 1973 to 1976, university students and labor unionists played only a small role, and the presence of so many bourgeois capitalists among these protesters showed up Suchinda's accusations of communist subversion as patently absurd.

Not only in Bangkok but in urban centers throughout the country ordinary working people, white collar and blue, came out to demonstrate peacefully. They wielded no weapons and threatened no one—except by their refusal to accept a revival of military rule. Yet Suchinda branded them a danger to the nation and to the sacred institutions of Buddhism and the monarchy, proffering this view over government-controlled airwaves and, through his field commanders, to troops brought in from the provinces to quash the demonstrations.

When Chamlong's march on the night of May 17 reached the strategic Phan Fa Bridge, it was halted by a razorwire barricade and a line of police and soldiers: a military force that was later revealed to have rivaled—both in troop strength and quantity of arms—Thailand's total defenses along the war-torn frontier with Cambodia. Hundreds of M-16s were fired into the air to disperse the crowd, but this only scattered the

protesters briefly. Those who regrouped, however, found the rifles leveled at them on their return.

Over the next four days scores of unarmed people were gunned down in the Bangkok streets; though the official count came to just 50, hundreds of protesters are still listed as missing. Chamlong and about 3,000 other demonstrators were arrested and taken to a detention facility, but Thais continued to pour into the area around Democracy Monument, defying Suchinda, Kaset, and Issarapong. A younger, less-disciplined element entered the fray, and a frenzy of rioting, arson, and vandalism broke out, continuing through Wednesday, May 20, with neither the people nor the military willing to give in.

RESOLUTION

Finally, as rumors spread that Suchinda's army rivals were ready to move against him and further escalate the conflict, King Bhumibol stepped forward and summoned the leading figure from each side to an audience. That night Suchinda and Chamlong were seen together on national television, literally crawling before the king to receive his rebuke and hear his command that they make peace.

It is important to understand that although absolute monarchy ended six decades ago the institution of kingship in its updated constitutional form has remained sacred. While King Bhumibol has no legal powers, he nonetheless enjoys his subjects' awe and devotion. Though his uncle, King Rama VII, felt compelled to abdicate shortly after the 1932 "revolution," and his elder brother and immediate predecessor was mysteriously shot to death in 1946, the present king has been able, during his 46 years on the throne, to restore the royal family's traditional aura and to translate prestige and popularity into subtle but authoritative influence over the country's real power brokers.

Only on rare occasions has the king publicly intervened in political matters. In 1973 he prevented a bloodbath when the intransigent military government tried to put down a student-led uprising, and in 1981 he sided with Prime Minister Prem when would-be coup makers tried to oust the constitutionally appointed government. Otherwise the king has stayed aloof from the internecine squabbles of politicians, knowing that to take sides in less than earth-shattering disputes could erode his moral authority and dilute the universal loyalty he commands among Thais.

By summoning both Suchinda and Chamlong before the television cameras, King Bhumibol could make the claim he was not favoring one camp over the other. But by keeping at his side during the audience former Prime Minister Prem, now a trusted privy councillor who still enjoys the loyalty of army officers outside Suchinda's clique, the king made the subtle point that he too was determined that Prem should go down in

history as Thailand's last military strongman. While dividing blame between Suchinda and Chamlong would save face for the former, the mere sight of the prime minister on his knees in the throne hall was enough to undermine Suchinda's authority. As instructed, Chamlong and Suchinda called on their people to fall back and desist. By the end of the week, Suchinda knew his dream was in ruins; he issued a blanket amnesty for all those involved in the violence of May 17–20, including himself, and resigned.

Parliament bickered for weeks afterward about who should replace Suchinda, but as was the case before he took office, no one in the majority bloc would trust anyone else with the job. Pro-democracy parties were unsuccessful in cobbling together a minority coalition, though they did manage to push through the constitutional amendments banning nonelected prime ministers and curbing the Senate's powers.

By the first week of June there was still no prime minister, and the best parliament could do was to nominate a former air force officer from the corruption-prone party Suchinda had deposed in 1991. The nomination went before the king—a mere formality, for though by law the king may choose his own prime minister, Bhumibol had never deluded himself with thinking that he actually could. Until now. The official version was that the speaker of the House of Representatives had decided to submit a different name, but many saw the stamp of the palace on the final choice. Pointing out that the amendment banning nonmembers of parliament from becoming prime minister would not become law until its publication in the *Royal Gazette*, the speaker returned to parliament with the king's reappointment of Anand Panyarachun, who had surprised the nation during his year in office and was about to surprise it again.

Over the vehement complaints of nearly all the members of parliament, Anand dressed down the assemblage for its failure to avert disaster in May, then exercised his constitutional prerogative to dissolve the body and call for new elections. Having done so, he reminded the country that politics was not his chosen field and that they had better get it right this time because he would not be back again.

CHIPPING AWAY

If Anand's background in business was brought to bear in his first administration, his diplomatic credentials came into play now. Despite popular demands for justice, Anand kept in mind that Suchinda, on resigning, had not only granted himself amnesty but had left his closest friends in charge of the military. While Kaset, Issarapong, and the others were now in seclusion, one could not expect a civilian prime minister

who simply fired them not to face an instant retaliatory coup. Heeding Issarapong's explicit warning not to back him into a corner, Anand proceeded cautiously, charging his new defense minister with an investigation of the crackdown and refusing to address the issue of blame directly until the investigation was complete. Anand then set about chipping away at the foundations of military patronage.

As Kaset and Issarapong derived most of their patronage from chairmanships of state enterprises—Kaset heading Thai Airways and Issarapong the telephone company's board of directors—Anand engineered their removal from these posts and made it possible for other government-run corporations to get rid of the generals on their boards, who had long benefited financially from the ties. Until Anand, however, no one had been in a position or had the foresight to put a stop to this. Then, without dismissing either Issarapong or Kaset from his military post, Anand diminished the pair's power to threaten the government by simply dissolving the special internal security roles inherent in their commands—the mechanisms that had enabled them to send troops against civilians in May.

Kaset reacted angrily to these actions and suggested a coup was still possible. But knowing Kaset would not risk moving against the king's own first minister, Anand said something that no Thai prime minister before had. "I am sure that a majority of the people would see a coup d'état as treason against the country and the throne," he told the press, belying the traditional notion that military men had a responsibility to protect country and crown from the evil designs of politicians and the people's misguided aspirations.²

Two weeks later Anand announced important changes in the military hierarchy. Diplomatically pretending that the move was unrelated to the incidents of May, Anand "promoted" Kaset and Issarapong to ceremonial posts with no links to active troop units. The new army commander in chief, General Vimol Wongwanich, declared coups "obsolete" and affirmed that henceforth he and other Thai military men would "exercise our political rights only as ordinary citizens."³ In the annual promotions and assignments lists, Vimol reversed Suchinda's scheme of consolidating commands and divided the most important ones among nonaligned officers.

ELECTIONS AGAIN

While taming the military went a long way toward clearing the path for fairer elections, the state of party politics and the money factor remained causes for concern. Former members of parliament scrambled to disassociate themselves from the former government and the parliamentary majority that had backed Suchinda in May. The Samakhi Tham party changed its name, then died quietly as most members bolted to

²*Bangkok Post*, July 17, 1992, p. 1.

³*Bangkok Post Weekly Review*, August 14, 1992, p. 1.

other parties with more money. Ousted former prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan made a startling comeback, abandoning his tainted Chart Thai party and forming a new one to which numerous Samakhi Tham members flocked; for a while it looked as if Chatichai had the prime ministership sewed up. Campaigning as the innocent victim of a military takeover, Chatichai mended fences behind the scenes and established a new rapport with anxious soldiers who promised support.

But when Thais went to the polls on September 13—their second trip in six months—most votes went to the pro-democracy parties that had fought Suchinda, though as usual no single party gained a clear majority. Chamlong's party fared slightly better than it had in March but won only enough seats for a place in the coalition, not enough to make Chamlong prime minister. Chavalit's New Association party also won its leader a cabinet slot. The party to win the most seats, however, was the Democrat party, headed by soft-spoken Chuan Leekpai.

Chuan had kept a relatively low profile during the May unrest, but after the fact his cool-headedness was seen as a wiser, more responsible stance than Chamlong's stubborn determination. Chuan's long experience as a member of parliament and frequent cabinet minister were also cited. Furthermore, Chuan's party, Thailand's oldest, has a reputation for honesty and for listening to its constituents. Though it proved necessary to co-opt one of the so-called pro-military "devil" parties that had supported Suchinda, Chuan's people were able to forge a majority coalition controlling 203 of parliament's 360 seats—a comfortable margin over a presumably less unified opposition. Thus on September 23 Chuan Leekpai became the first Thai prime minister who had neither served in the armed forces nor had any links with the aristocracy.

Results from Thailand's September 1992 Parliamentary Elections

Party	Seats Won
Democrat	79
Chart Thai	77
Chart Pattana	60
New Aspiration	51
Palang Dharma	47
Social Action	22
Solidarity	8
Serirham	8
Muan Chon	4
Prachakorn	3
Rassadorn	1

Could this be the start of a new pattern of Thai politics?

Within fifteen months of the 1991 coup, analysts who had choked on earlier predictions of no more coups in Thailand could once again lift their heads. In the months that followed "Black May," the ultimate failure of the 1991 coup became undeniable, and it could once more be said that there had not been a successful coup in nearly 15 years. With civilian control over the military greater than it has ever been, Thai democracy is perhaps healthier than it was before the last coup. Yet no coalition government has ever lasted very long in Thailand. And it has been the case that even inactive officers have been known to generate coups in the past. ■

" 'Let us begin by telling ourselves the truth,' [President Fidel Ramos said in his inaugural speech]. We are in trouble. . . and 'there are no easy answers, no quick fixes.' Such an approach bodes well. Certainly the effort to forge a peaceful settlement with [guerrilla groups] and military dissidents is the right place to start. [However, the new president] does not seem sufficiently aware of the political consequences of the glaring inequalities in Philippine society—a failing he has in common with most Filipino elites."

Change or Continuity in the Philippines?

BY DAVID WURFEL

The May 1992 election was not a turning point in Philippine politics. That it was held, on schedule, that it was relatively free and honest, and that, despite a narrow victory in a multicandidate race, constitutional procedures were followed right down to the installation of Fidel Ramos—all this served to strengthen rather than weaken Philippine democracy. But there was so much dissatisfaction with the process—the great number of candidates, the confusion of simultaneous national and local elections, the lack of attention to issues, and the massive expenditures, including vote buying—that the events of May and June hardly constituted the conclusive "consolidation of democracy" that so many participants and analysts had been looking for. That consolidation now depends on the way in which President Ramos uses his power and how effectively he deals with the Philippines' many economic, social, and political problems.

HOW DIFFERENT ARE THEY?

There are vast differences in the way Corazon Aquino, the previous president, and Fidel Ramos gained office. Cory Aquino was denied election in 1986 by fraud orchestrated by backers of President Ferdinand Marcos, despite being the more popular figure. She gained the presidency only as a result of a rebellion by a portion of the military, backed by "people power" demonstrations. The United States supported Marcos until nearly the very end, so Aquino felt in no way beholden to the White House, even though the American media and elements in the Congress in Washington strongly supported her. During the first months of her administration relations with Washington were cool; only much later did she

endorse a new treaty on United States military bases in the Philippines, and then not effectively.

Curiously, Ramos, a West Point graduate and former commander of the Philippine Constabulary, chief of staff of the armed forces, and secretary of defense, owes less to the military than Aquino did. Precincts in or near military camps reported large blocs of votes in the May election for Judge Miriam Defensor-Santiago, or for Aquino's estranged cousin, "Danding" Cojuangco, but not for General Ramos—though Ramos does have a coterie of military supporters. Ramos was backed strongly by the anti-Marcos segment of the business community, by numerous members of the Philippine Congress, and by key elements of the Aquino administration. He was also cautiously and discreetly supported by the United States. But perhaps most important were the "campaign" swings around the country that he had been making for two or three years in which he established personal ties with local political leaders.

Though Ramos ultimately received a vigorous endorsement from Aquino, it almost did not happen. Ramos had declared his candidacy before the December 1991 nominating convention of the LDP (Lakas ng Demokratikong Pilipino, or "Strength of Philippine Democracy"), the largest political party, which backed the Aquino administration and whose secretary general was Congressman "Peping" Cojuangco, the president's brother. But during the convention Aquino hardly lifted a finger for Ramos, while her brother maneuvered, successfully, to nominate Speaker of the House Ramon Mitra. At first Ramos seemed resigned to exclusion from the race and said he would support the LDP ticket. But later, perhaps having received signals from the presidential palace, he charged that he had been cheated of the nomination and would form his own political party.

Not until late January did Aquino give her endorsement to his independent candidacy. She clearly had no

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faith in either the honesty or the electability of Speaker Mitra. Her disgust with the corrupt behavior of her brother, which she had been unable to control, may also have been revealed in this split from the LDP. But it is certain that Ramos relied more on his own network of alliances than on Aquino's help.

Alliance building to achieve power was important after election day as well as before. When the congressional canvass of the votes began in late May, both Santiago and onetime Marcos crony "Danding" Cojuangco claimed they led the polls, and no one denied it was a close race. Unlike Santiago, however, Cojuangco had a sizable block of supporters in Congress, and in the early days of the canvass they charged fraud and attempted to slow the pace of the process.

The consequences of delay could have been disastrous. If congressional canvassing had not been completed by June 30, the Philippines would have been without a president or a legally established procedure for choosing one—a power vacuum into which the military would have been likely to intrude. There are questions about what the real potential was for delay by Cojuangco's faction, but developments in the newly elected Congress in July imply that some deal was struck between Cojuangco's Nationalist People's Coalition and the Ramos forces. The NPC supported the Ramos-backed candidates for House speaker and Senate president, despite Aquino's urging that Ramos seek an alliance with the LDP. Cojuangco would expect in return to see his economic interests protected by the new administration.

Aquino's and Ramos's methods of achieving power were sufficiently different that his pledge to carry on the work she had begun and her backing of his candidacy are not in themselves sufficient basis for forecasting continuity of policy. Neither can such continuity be predicated on similarity of background and experience (although both Ramos and Aquino received bachelor's degrees in the United States, he at West Point and she at a Catholic women's college). And though both have been characterized as having a cautious, even vacillating, decision-making style, there are other important differences.

Aquino was born into one of the wealthiest Chinese-Filipino families, once the largest owner of the country's rice-producing lands; in addition to holding a large sugar plantation in Tarlac and a family bank. Despite her personal modesty and graciousness she had little opportunity to learn to understand the plight of the vast majority of Filipinos. Ramos's background could best be described as upper-middle class. His father, Narciso, was a lawyer and journalist who owned some land in Pangasinan province. First elected to the national legislature in the early 1930s, Narciso Ramos was for a time after World War II ambassador to Taipei (marking the beginning of the family's close links with Taiwanese interests). In 1966 he became Marcos's first

secretary of foreign affairs. Fidel Ramos, in choosing a military career, lived and worked within an institution whose officer corps was mostly from the middle or the lower-middle class, which helped color his perceptions of reality. He was brought up a Protestant, while Aquino came from a strict Roman Catholic family.

The elements within the elite with whom Aquino and Ramos have most often associated have not been that different, however. Aquino's close ties with business leaders seem quite natural, given her family background; they were reinforced in 1985 when she became the head of the forces attempting to end the Marcos stranglehold on the economy. Ramos was also courted at that time by the anti-Marcos business elite, who saw him as someone who could bring stability to the country. With the growing fear early this year that "Danding" Cojuangco might win the presidential election, and afterward restore "crony capitalism," those same businesspeople again turned to Ramos. Both Aquino and Ramos have had especially strong ties with the Chinese segment of the business elite. The only clear differences in their patterns of association have been Aquino's close links to Jaime Cardinal Sin and the Catholic hierarchy and Ramos's friends among retired generals.

The relations of the two presidents with those on the left of the Philippine political spectrum have not been all that different either, though superficially the contrast might seem sharp. As commander of the military effort to crush a Communist-led insurgency, Ramos's knowledge of the left was based on information provided by military intelligence that was sometimes inaccurate or exaggerated. He was often seen as the enemy not only by insurgents but also by human rights advocates.

Aquino, however, associated with leftists in the opposition, indirectly through her husband, Benigno, and more directly in the mid-1980s, when her own coalition included people from the non-Communist left; she even appointed as her executive secretary a human rights lawyer who had sometimes defended insurgents. These contacts apparently had little impact on her; in 1987 she quickly imbibed the military's view of the left and based policy on it, ridding her administration of those with a leftist tinge.

Even the moderate reformists, mostly connected with the Catholic Church, who made up the bulk of the "people power" movement in 1986 did not remain influential among those with access to Aquino. Middle-of-the-road nongovernment organizations were by the late 1980s more often Aquino's critics than her advisers, and left-of-center reformist groups had little contact with her. Last year the press reported that Ramos was in the process of establishing links with certain nongovernment organizations, but for the most part these were either business-funded or the fronts for

local politicians, set up to receive national government funds.

In examining personal background and patterns of support and association, as well as methods of gaining power, it is possible to find hints of both change and continuity that could be expected from a Ramos administration. The factors most frequently publicized have pointed toward Ramos continuing Aquino's policies, but this is not the whole story.

Perhaps the most obvious place to look for a shift is in population policy. Cardinal Sin was during Aquino's tenure a frequent visitor to Malacanang Palace, and a close confidant of the president. His opposition to artificial methods of birth control was well known, and he personally persuaded Aquino to abandon much of the population planning program begun under Marcos, which had been registering some success. Ramos, who is a Protestant, kept a statue of the Virgin Mary on his desk when he was defense secretary, and he recently reassured the Catholic Church that he would "respect its views" on contraception. But he went on to say, "It is the government's obligation to provide the best possible information to our married couples, who must make the basic decision of how many children they want. We are committed to reduce the rate of population growth in this country." One has reason to expect renewed activity in government birth control clinics.

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE INSURGENCY

The central issues for the Ramos administration, however, are the same as they were for its predecessor: democratic stability and the closely related issue of economic growth. Whatever her faults, Aquino reestablished constitutional government in the Philippines in 1986–1987. Her dictatorial powers under the "Freedom Constitution" she proclaimed were used sparingly; the Constitutional Commission she appointed devised a new draft, which was ratified by plebiscite in February 1987. The form of government established was largely a restoration of the one in place before the declaration of martial law in 1972, which had been modeled substantially on that of the United States. The distribution of powers among the three branches of government perhaps gave the Philippine president greater power than the American chief executive—though Aquino often failed to use it—and the system was unitary rather than federal. However, the greatest divergence from the American model derived not from the constitution itself but from the social structure and culture that determine the way in which institutions function in the Philippines.

The restoration of free elections and a strongly worded bill of rights did not create a fully democratic system in the Philippines. Elections again became contests between elite groups that sought support

mainly by distributing money and favors through extensive patron-client networks. The 1987 Congress was composed mostly of Marcos-era incumbents (about one-fifth of the membership) and scions of wealthy families that had held power in their districts for decades, or even generations. The wide array of groups and classes that had helped topple Marcos were hardly represented. The best indication of the economic interests of the legislators was their emasculation of the broadly supported land reform proposed in 1987.

A democratic system should protect human rights as well as promote effective representation of public interests. Aquino, whose husband had been imprisoned, then assassinated, by the martial law regime, began with a strong commitment to human rights. She restored the writ of habeas corpus, created a Presidential Committee on Human Rights headed by the courageous and forceful ex-Senator Jose Diokno, and announced the release of all political prisoners, including Communist party leaders. The committee also began to prepare indictments of some of the military's notorious torturers.

However, as early as 1987 there was evidence of a sharp rise in the country in imprisonment without trial, disappearances, torture, and "salvagings" (unauthorized killings—including among their victims human rights lawyers—by the military and their allies). After 1988 the disappearances and "salvagings" began to decline, but in the first six months of 1991 there were still more than 25 reported in both categories, with more than 600 political prisoners remaining in detention—about the same as at the beginning of Aquino's term. Hardly any officers were convicted for Marcos-era violations and none was imprisoned; many were promoted. Why, in spite of Aquino's apparently sincere beginning, did this attack on human life and liberty continue? Defense of the existing social structure and pattern of institutional power against a determined challenge served—at least for the ruling elite—to justify the continuing violations.

Profound socioeconomic inequality in rural areas, exacerbated by a history of military abuses, had triggered an insurgency under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By 1985 this had reached unprecedented proportions: the New People's Army (NPA), nearly 20,000 strong, was the largest Marxist guerrilla force in Asia. Though severely set back by the overthrow of Marcos by a gentler leader and the restoration of relatively free elections with some leftist participation—not to mention the impact on morale of an extended cease-fire negotiated with Aquino's representatives—the insurgency persisted into the late 1980s, providing the Aquino administration with a rationale for maintaining a large military.

The armed forces' political ambitions had been stirred by Marcos, especially by the manner of his overthrow. As military factions began to mount coup

attempts, Aquino found the armed forces more and more difficult to discipline, and decided to appease them instead. When the cease-fire with the NPA ended in February 1987 she endorsed a "total approach" to insurgency that resembled total war.

Private anti-Communist vigilante groups (including those formed by religious fanatics, and private armies organized by wealthy landowners) were at first embraced, and then, when their brutality against anyone even suspected of being an NPA sympathizer was publicized, ineffectually regulated by the administration. Local militias loosely attached to the military, which had been a major source of human rights violations under Marcos, were abolished by the 1987 constitution, but Aquino, under pressure from General Ramos, quickly re-created them under another name. By the late 1980s, violations by the military and its various allies were given fresh excuses by undisciplined attacks on civilians and by the waning, and frustrated, insurgency; violence against innocent civilians by one side was cited as a justification of similar violence by the other. The administration had largely lost control of events in the countryside. Only an entirely new approach to ending the insurgency could improve the situation.

Given his military background, many were surprised that Ramos tried a new tack. This was conceived of not so much as a way to protect human rights as a means of ensuring political stability, the foundation for economic growth. Ramos has recently offered amnesty for political crimes both to military rebels, some of whose leaders are still at large, and to Communist-led insurgents. At the same time he has promised to legalize the Communist party. (Both these proposals must receive Congressional approval.) But Communist leaders are unwilling to lay down their arms and renounce violence in order to receive amnesty, unless they can also attach political conditions. Furthermore, amnesty for "political crimes" is of little value if those accused of these offenses have also been charged with criminal ones. The Philippine army continues to launch attacks on the guerrillas, but this does not prevent informal consultations between the government and leaders of the insurgencies.

Greatly in the government's favor are the deep splits in the revolutionary movement on how to react to peace overtures. Communist party leaders in exile in the Netherlands seem to have taken the hardest line, making demands that would certainly frustrate any peaceful settlement. Yet the Ramos administration has been able to persuade two prominent former members of the National Democratic Front, the party's political arm, to act as advisers to the government team. Within the left, there are several other positions. Some are wary of the Ramos initiative, fearing it is only a ploy to create a deadlock that will be used to justify even more vigorous military action. Others believe there are at

least some in government who are sincerely interested in ending the fighting and that every effort should be made to find a compromise solution. Whatever discussions have taken place with military rebels or with the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front on Mindanao and Sulu have received much less press attention.

If Ramos could extract from each of these sets of negotiations a lasting agreement, he would indeed be in a much better position to pursue economic development. The major question is whether the values, past practices, and prejudices of Ramos the general will prevail, or whether his new role as a president who plans for the future and is freer of the constraint of factional maneuvering within the military than his predecessor was will determine the outcome. Ramos certainly benefits from the fact that the three rebel forces are weaker than when last they had serious discussions with the government.

CORRUPTION AS CANCER

Amnesties, cease-fires, and peace agreements with the rebels, sought but never achieved by Aquino, may still not be sufficient to secure political stability. Corruption is also a cancer that can undermine a government. Corruption—state officials putting private profit ahead of the public good, in violation of laws and regulations—was not new in the Philippines in the 1970s, but it became more deeply embedded in the culture and in the conduct of business and government during the Marcos era. What was acceptable expanded, and the options for a truly honest bureaucrat were narrowed.

Aquino's personal reputation was pure as the driven snow, and she came to office apparently determined to bring Marcos and his cronies to justice and pledged to uphold high standards of honesty for her own administration. Unfortunately she achieved neither goal. Initially she made high-quality appointments to the Philippine Commission on Good Government, which was assigned to recover the wealth that President Marcos and his cronies had stolen, and much was accomplished in its first year, but by 1988 the commission was headed by the attorney of Aquino's brother in Congress, "Peping" Cojuangco, one of the most corrupt figures in her administration. Aquino was a woman of traditional values; she was loyal to her family, and she proved not to be strong enough to control them. In fact, she sometimes protected them against corruption charges. When the behavior of her relatives became widely known, the standard of probity in the administration declined generally. The magnitude of the corruption was probably nowhere near what it had been under Marcos, and unlike before 1986, it was somewhat decentralized. But it was sufficiently obvious to contribute to the decline in popular support for Aquino during her last few years in office.

Ramos did not approach the presidency with a record as clean as Aquino's. The most serious charge against him—which he has never attempted to rebut—is that the Philippine Constabulary was the most corrupt branch of the armed forces during his years as commander of the constabulary. And the man President Ramos backed for speaker of the House, Representative Jose de Venecia, has recently been linked to some of the most corrupt elements remaining in the military. Another member of congress, accused by environmental groups of being involved in illegal logging, has been named by Ramos as his executive secretary, a powerful post sometimes accorded the title “assistant president.” The Ramos administration is thus in grave danger of allowing a level of corruption that will threaten its legitimacy, put weapons in the hands of its enemies, and jeopardize effective economic management.

This would be particularly unfortunate in view of the high degree of confidence that business leaders have shown in the Ramos presidency. Ramos has reciprocated, appointing business leaders to his cabinet; for instance, his secretary of foreign affairs, Roberto Romulo, is former chairman of IBM Philippines and his new finance secretary, Ramon del Rosario, is chairman of Asia Bank.

The economy, which contracted in 1991—for the first time in the Aquino presidency—grew 0.5 percent in the first quarter of this year. Partly because of this, and perhaps also in anticipation of a peaceful election producing a new era of stability, foreign equity investment in the first quarter of the year was up 19 percent over 1991. Ramos thus took office in a rising economic tide.

The Aquino presidency had also started out well economically, moving the country quickly to rapid growth from the sharp recession of 1985. This was in part because considerable wealth since 1983 had either left the country or gone into hiding; in 1986 it began to be spent and invested. The flow of foreign aid and credit to a regime so highly regarded in the banking centers of the West was also a great boost. But adherence to trade and investment liberalization was not as complete as paper agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would seem to indicate. And above all, the investment climate was hurt by repeated coup attempts. The kidnapping and holding for five months of a senior Japanese business executive in 1986 put a particular damper on Japanese investment just at a time when, because of the yen revaluation, Japanese funds were surging into other Southeast Asian countries.

Thus with further deceleration caused by a worldwide recession, the Philippine economy had begun to shrink by 1991. And despite refinancing agreements intended to reduce the repayment burden of the massive foreign debt, that debt actually increased from

\$26 billion to \$30 billion between 1986 and 1991. Congress—motivated by the fact that 39 percent of the national budget went to payments of interest and principal, which contributed to a net outflow of capital—tried to put a cap on Philippine debt servicing, but Aquino blocked it. Her advisers feared a ceiling—15 percent of exports of goods and services, for instance—would cause the Philippines' foreign credit sources to dry up. In fact, among major third world debtors, the Philippines was one of the most compliant with IMF and World Bank policy.

Business optimism about a Ramos presidency is indeed predicated largely on an expectation of political stability. But it will take more than political stability and friendship with businesspeople to promote economic growth. If one assumes that IMF and World Bank policies are appropriate, then the Ramos commitment to continue cooperation with them will be helpful. Such a stance has already won another debt rescheduling. But if the net capital outflow of more than \$2 billion a year continues, primarily because of debt servicing, a new approach may be needed. A struggle between president and Congress over a debt service cap may reemerge; the inability of Ramos partisans thus far to control the Senate could lead to a vigorous tussle.

A feisty Congress could also hamper Ramos's announced commitment to raise taxes and improve revenue collection, which are essential for economic recovery. The Philippine state has long been the most ineffective in Asia in terms of percentage of gross national product collected in taxes. Yet without increased revenues debts cannot be repaid, education cannot be supported—some teachers are already on a hunger strike because of nonpayment of salaries—the infrastructure necessary to support new investment cannot be built, and bureaucrats cannot be paid enough to reduce the temptation to dishonesty.

Because of the Senate's rejection last year of a new treaty on United States military bases, and an American pullout accelerated by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, Ramos also faces a severe drop in American assistance, direct and indirect. Partly for reasons associated with American politics and economics, and partly because of American pique at the Philippine rejection of the bases treaty, the administration of President George Bush and the United States Congress greeted President Ramos with a 60 percent cut in military and economic assistance for 1992, with the prospect of a cut of another 50 percent for 1993. These losses, which could cost the Philippines over \$300 million in the first year, are in addition to a nearly equal loss of income from the actual operation of the bases. (The shock will be somewhat delayed by the disbursement of substantial separation payments to former base workers by the United States; next year will be worse.) This shock could have been lessened if the Aquino administration

had been serious about planning for new uses for base facilities, but after various studies and the appointment of a special bases conversion commissioner, there is still no concrete plan. So Central Luzon, also devastated by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, will soon be in even deeper depression. And it is too late to think about other uses of Clark Field, since what has not been destroyed by Pinatubo has mostly been looted.

The loss of military assistance, and the consequent pressure from his secretary of defense for new, compensating budget outlays, naturally cause Ramos—who has often been charged by Filipino journalists with being an “American boy”—to try to discover mechanisms by which the Americans could be persuaded to stay on at Subic Bay and continue using the extensive ship repair facilities there, perhaps on a commercial basis. But the Americans symbolized the finality of their departure when they began towing the huge floating drydocks at Subic to Guam early this year, and Ramos has surprised some by his unwillingness to beg the Americans to stay. When asked by American diplomats to make a proposal, he bravely told the press, “They are the ones who need those facilities, not us.” But he added, “If we can arrive at an acceptable agreement which will result in mutual benefits for the two countries, well, let’s study that.”

In fact, it is unlikely that the bases use question will ever again become the tremendous irritant it once was in United States–Philippine relations. The relative insignificance of this issue during this year’s presidential campaign was an indication that most Filipinos believe the matter is behind them. Though the short-term cost may be high (but probably less than some base advocates warned), there is still considerable satisfaction among many Filipinos that the umbilical cord with the United States has been broken.

As on the bases question, other fundamental errors of the Aquino administration plague Ramos’s current economic plans. There is, for instance, the failure to prevent the frequent power blackouts in Manila and elsewhere, which, in addition to severe inconvenience and discomfort, dramatically reduce industrial productivity every day. The Bataan nuclear power plant, built by the American giant Westinghouse after extremely corrupt dealings with Marcos cronies, is located near an active volcano and an earthquake fault, its safety features based on outdated technology. Even before the end of Marcos’s rule its power production had been delayed by court action and investigations, though everyone recognized that its productive capacity was soon to be needed. Aquino decided to mothball the plant indefinitely and took legal action against Westing-

house for bribery. But no plans were made for additional capacity, giving rise to the most severe electric power crisis in Philippine history. Thus Ramos is talking about reopening Bataan, despite dire warnings from safety experts, and has given the highest priority to new plants with more conventional technology. (No high official is talking about conservation of energy.)

A distinct deterrent to investment—the escalation of kidnappings of wealthy businesspeople, mostly Chinese—has also been tackled by Ramos through the creation of a special commission with Vice President Joseph Estrada at the helm. (The onetime movie tough guy has unearthed a kidnapping ring involving top police officials.)

Ramos was praised by the Philippine press, and rightly so, for the straight talk in his inaugural address. “Let us begin by telling ourselves the truth.” We are in trouble, he continued, and “there are no easy answers, no quick fixes.” Such an approach bodes well. Certainly the effort to forge a peaceful settlement with Communist-led insurgents, Muslim rebels, and military dissidents is the right place to start. But unfortunately there is no evidence that the Ramos administration is prepared to deal adequately with the problems that allow the more principled leaders of these groups to continue gaining adherents. There are hints that the agrarian reform that is already progressing at a snail’s pace will be scaled back, and there do not yet appear to be any serious plans to bring genuine Muslim autonomy or to crack down on corruption. Ramos does not seem sufficiently aware of the political consequences of the glaring inequalities in Philippine society—a failing he has in common with most Filipino elites.

Nor has the administrative performance of Ramos’s team been that impressive thus far. Quarrels over patronage and turf have frustrated the implementation of new policies. Ramos has appointed eight presidential advisers whose jurisdictions conflict with those of cabinet members, and he attempts to deal directly with subcabinet officers over the heads of their superiors. In the “chaos that surrounds him,” as the *Far Eastern Economic Review*’s Rigoberto Tiglao calls it, Ramos has already lost his first executive secretary. There may be more continuity with Aquino here than anyone wanted.

It seems unlikely that the stock market euphoria that immediately followed his election will be sustained by Ramos’s performance in his first year. There are both positive initiatives and forewarnings of serious problems. The “consolidation” of Philippine democracy hangs in the balance. ■

The end of the cold war and the death of Soviet-style communism have spurred North Korea to look to its southern neighbor—and the possibility of reunification. Progress toward this goal gained speed throughout 1991 and in 1992, but has now stalled because of recent North Korean actions that have renewed fears in South Korea about the north's true motives.

The Koreans: In Search of Reunification

BY HONG NACK KIM

After nearly 45 years of hostility and confrontation, South and North Korea have begun to take steps to normalize relations, which could ensure peace on the peninsula and ultimately pave the way for reunification. On December 13, 1991, the prime ministers of the two countries signed a nonaggression agreement that promised reconciliation and cooperation. This was followed a few weeks later by the signing of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. If fully implemented, these agreements will usher in a new era for the divided peninsula.

A COLD WAR HISTORY

Products of the cold war, the rival regimes in Korea engaged in fierce competition to win the Korean people's support and recognition by the world community as the sole legitimate government on the peninsula. Each denied the legitimacy of the other while proclaiming its own.

To the North Korean Communists, the government of the Republic of Korea in the south was nothing but a "puppet regime of American imperialism" that had to be overthrown by any means necessary. North Korean President Kim Il-Sung attempted to communize South Korea through armed invasion beginning in June 1950, but his bid was thwarted in July 1953, largely by the joint efforts of South Korea and the United Nations. Kim dispatched a commando unit to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-Hee in January 1969, but the unit was wiped out in Seoul. In October 1983 Kim's agents tried to assassinate President Chun Doo-Hwan in Rangoon, Burma (now Yangon, Myanmar). Although Chun escaped unharmed, 17 prominent South Korean leaders, including 4 cabinet

members, were killed by time bombs set by the North Koreans.

To be sure, Kim has also utilized nonviolent tactics and schemes in the continuing attempt to realize his dream of a Communist South Korea. For example, he was willing to engage, beginning in summer 1972, in a series of dialogues with Seoul on the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. Although Seoul and Pyongyang signed a joint statement outlining basic principles for reunification, the north-south dialogue ended abruptly in August 1973 when Pyongyang unilaterally called off further talks with the south. In October 1980, Kim advocated the reunification of the two Koreas through a confederation of North and South Korea. Unwilling to deal with the existing South Korean government, which he denounced as fascist, Kim urged the establishment of a "democratic"—meaning pro-Communist—government in South Korea with which the north would join. South Korean leaders rejected the proposal as a sinister plot.

Meanwhile, South Korea's attitude toward the north also remained antagonistic until the early 1970s. Under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee, Seoul's policy was the recovery of sovereignty in the north, by force if necessary. Following the May 1961 military coup, however, General Park Chung-Hee, who was declared president in 1963, discarded the idea of employing force to reunify the two Koreas. He emphasized instead the importance of building up national strength under the slogan "construction first, unification later." In 1970 Park embraced the idea of "peaceful unification," while demanding that North Korea abandon its attempt to communize the south; he proposed a friendly competition for development between the two countries.

In 1973 Park announced that his government would not oppose the north's entry into the United Nations along with South Korea; his country, he said, "would open its doors to all nations of the world," "peace and good neighborliness" being the new basic principles of

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its foreign policy. Park's conciliatory gesture was based on the assumption that the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas had to be institutionalized before any effective steps toward reunification could be taken; in view of the unmitigated hostility between the two, it was thought unrealistic to expect peaceful unification without a phase of peaceful coexistence.

Kim immediately rejected the proposal on simultaneous entry into the UN on grounds that it would perpetuate the division of Korea. When South Korea and its allies began in 1974 to advocate cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan), North Korea denounced this as a scheme the United States and its cohorts had cooked up to keep the two Koreas separate. Until 1990 South Korea made little headway in these endeavors—despite the much publicized dialogue between north and south that took place from October 1984 to spring 1986—largely because of North Korea's unwillingness to accommodate South Korea's incremental approach to the goal of reunification.

BOLD MOVES FROM A FIRM ECONOMIC BASE

In the summer of 1988, South Korea adopted a bold new foreign policy toward the Communist north. On July 7, President Roh Tae-Woo declared the south would no longer regard North Korea as an adversary but as a fellow member of a single ethnic community; that it would strive to move the north from its self-imposed policy of isolation and help it participate as a responsible member in the international community; and that it would continuously apply its policy of increased mutual cooperation and reconciliation with the north. Furthermore, Roh declared his government's intention to work to put an end to counterproductive diplomatic competition between south and north.

Roh in the July 7 declaration also laid down the foundation for what is generally known as the "northern policy." This policy's primary goal was the opening of full diplomatic relationships with Communist countries. Such a move, leaders believed, would be helpful in inducing North Korea to abandon its illusion of communizing the south, to recognize the South Korean government as legitimate and sovereign, and to accept peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas as a first step toward peaceful reunification.¹

South Korea's northern policy was timely since the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe were

experimenting with drastic political and economic reforms that enabled them to adopt more realistic views on exchanges and cooperation with South Korea. In addition, a new spirit of détente in East-West relations fostered a favorable international climate transcending differences in ideology and social systems. In February 1989 South Korea opened diplomatic relations with Hungary, followed quickly by Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. By the following September it had diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. South Korea and China agreed to exchange trade offices with de facto consular functions in October 1990, and on August 24 of this year the two countries established diplomatic relations.

These developments inevitably shocked North Korea, for it had not expected such quick success for South Korea's northern policy, which undermined the north's diplomatic, political, and security interests. Moreover, the collapse of Communist systems in Eastern Europe and the deepening crisis in the Soviet Union aroused an acute uneasiness in North Korean leaders about the survival of Kim Il-Sung's regime. In order to cope, North Korea began to alter its policy toward South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

First, North Korea agreed to hold talks between the North and South Korean prime ministers alternately in each other's capital. In September 1990 in Seoul, the two countries' prime ministers met for the first time since the division of the Korean Peninsula. A second round of talks took place in Pyongyang in October and a third round in Seoul in December. South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young-Hoon emphasized confidence-building through economic and other person-to-person exchanges, whereas North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-Muk stressed the importance of tackling political and military concerns such as mutual arms reduction, the withdrawal of United States forces and nuclear weapons, and a nonaggression pact. The first three rounds saw little progress, but it was significant that both sides were willing to continue the high-level talks.

Meanwhile, North Korea decided to work toward normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan, which Pyongyang had always ruled out before, on the grounds that such a move would lead to the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the major powers. This move toward rapprochement was clearly designed to tap into the Japanese capital and technology needed to boost the stagnating North Korean economy, as well as to compensate for diplomatic setbacks dealt by Seoul's successful implementation of its northern policy.² In May 1991 North Korea also dropped its opposition to the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the UN, marking a profound policy shift. In September, both North and South Korea became UN members.

These about-faces clearly reflected Pyongyang's growing economic difficulties and mounting anxiety that

¹For a detailed analysis, see Hong Nack Kim, "The Two Koreas' Entry into the United Nations and the Implications for Inter-Korean Relations," *Korea and World Affairs*, Fall 1991, p. 404.

²See Hong Nack Kim, "Japan's Relations with North Korea," *Current History*, April 1991, p. 165.

the widening gap in economic power between the two Koreas could precipitate the possible "absorption" of north by south through a process similar to the one seen in Germany's reunification. South Korea's per capita gross national product was over five times that of North Korea (\$5,569 versus \$1,064 in 1990), which meant South Korea's GNP was 10 times greater (\$238 billion versus \$23 billion in 1990). In view of the high economic growth rate in South Korea (approximately 9 percent annually in 1990 and 1991) and the shrinking of North Korea's economy (-3.7 percent in 1990 and -5.2 percent in 1991), it became apparent by 1991 that North Korea would not economically catch up with South Korea in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, after the American-led coalition's decisive victory in the Persian Gulf War in early 1991, the emerging post-cold war balance of power was shaping up as increasingly more favorable to the United States and its allies. Furthermore, the demise of Soviet communism following the abortive coup in August 1991 dealt a severe blow to North Korea, which had relied heavily on the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance. Nor was Beijing providing needed help to its small Communist neighbor.

Saddled with a stagnant economy and an uncertain political succession, the top priority of the North Korean leadership was its survival rather than the communization of South Korea or reunification on its terms. Thus it became necessary for North Korea to enter the UN as a separate member, which enhanced the country's legitimacy, bolstered its international position, and strengthened national security. It was also considered desirable to mend fences with Japan, the United States, and South Korea.

The fourth round of talks between the Korean prime ministers, which had been postponed by Pyongyang because of a military exercise planned by the United States and South Korea, finally took place last October. The two sides agreed to work out a single comprehensive accord outlining procedures for terminating the state of confrontation and promoting peaceful exchanges and cooperation. North Korean officials expressed their willingness to expand not only trade but also economic cooperation.

EPOCHAL MOMENTS

At the fifth prime ministers' conference, held in Seoul on December 11-13, 1991, the two prime ministers signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation Between the North and the South (hereafter referred to as the "Basic Agreement"). The accord, hailed as an "epochal event" by both Pyongyang and Seoul, was the first

official document signed by the two Koreas since 1948. In it, both sides pledged to respect the other's system, not to interfere in its internal affairs, and not to use force or armed aggression against it. Confidence-building measures including advance notification of military exercises and the exchange of military inspection teams were written in. A joint military commission was to be established to discuss armistice violations, and a hotline between the two capitals would be installed for consultation in times of crisis. The pact also called for economic cooperation and broader humanitarian contacts. The agreement was possible because of concessions by both sides: for example, Pyongyang was ready to negotiate a peace treaty with South Korea in due course instead of insisting on signing one with the United States, while Seoul accepted a comprehensive approach to inter-Korean relations in place of its piecemeal one.

Regarding measures to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the two sides agreed to assign the task of finalizing the draft to the representatives of the two governments who were to meet in Panmunjom in the latter part of December. Apparently, North Korea needed more time to study South Korea's proposal on the nuclear issue. North Korea wanted to insert, for example, paragraphs prohibiting the continued extension of the United States nuclear umbrella to South Korea. It also wanted to ban the passage through South Korean territory of foreign aircraft or vessels carrying nuclear weapons. South Korea, however, opposed the inclusion of such clauses in the proposed agreement.

The meeting also led to the historic December 31 declaration by North and South Korea to rid the Korean Peninsula of all nuclear weapons. The six-article document (hereafter the "Joint Declaration") stipulated that both South and North Korea were prohibited from possessing or developing nuclear arms, along with nuclear fuel processing facilities, and uranium-enrichment technology.³ To ensure compliance they pledged to set up within a month of the declaration's ratification a Joint Nuclear Control Commission that would handle the inspection of sites mutually agreed on.

Pyongyang's conciliatory attitude was apparently facilitated by United States President George Bush's initiative of September 1991 on withdrawing land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons worldwide; later the United States decided to withdraw nuclear weapons carried by bombers from South Korea. On December 18 Roh declared that no nuclear weapons were in the country. And following the announcement of the cancellation of the 1992 joint military exercises during Bush's visit to Seoul in early January 1992, Pyongyang finally signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards agreement allowing international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

At the sixth round of the prime ministers' talks held

³For the text of the Basic Agreement, see *Korea and World Affairs*, Spring 1992, pp. 145-148. For that of the Joint Declaration, see *ibid.*, Spring 1992, p. 149.

in Pyongyang in February 1992, Seoul and Pyongyang exchanged ratified copies of the two major agreements previously signed. The two sides agreed on the composition of the membership of three subcommittees: the North-South Political Committee, the Military Committee, and the Exchanges and Cooperation Committee. In March, they reached an agreement on the composition of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission membership and mutual nuclear inspection by mid-June.

At the seventh round of talks held in Seoul in early May, Seoul and Pyongyang agreed to allow at least 100 families separated by the demilitarized zone to visit for brief reunions in August—major progress in an important area of humanitarian concern that was taken as an indication of Pyongyang's sincerity in seeking rapprochement. In addition, the two prime ministers signed a series of protocols for the subcommittees set up by the treaties. In a related move, on May 18 Seoul and Pyongyang established the south-north liaison offices in Panmunjom, scheduled to become fully operational after both sides adopted a separate protocol at the next prime ministers' talks in September.

IN BAD FAITH?

These breakthroughs aroused great hope and many expectations. But initial optimism was dashed as implementation of the Basic Agreement stalled in the summer of 1992 over a number of thorny problems.

First, North Korea turned recalcitrant after agreeing to mutual inspection of nuclear weapons sites. Seoul regarded these inspections as essential even though Pyongyang had signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA; suspicion was growing that the north would not open all its facilities to international inspection or abandon its program to develop nuclear arms. In an attempt to forestall work under this program, South Korea proposed the pilot inspection of sites in both Koreas. Pyongyang then demanded that South Korea open to inspectors all United States military facilities within its borders in return for the south's inspection of the Yongbyon nuclear complex in North Korea.

In March, the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission worked out an alternative plan to conduct pilot inspection of one nuclear site in each country by June 1992. However, the agreement was not implemented because of Pyongyang's delaying tactics. Specifically, Pyongyang insisted that the two Koreas adopt a separate protocol for the Joint Declaration before there could be any mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities. Furthermore, it demanded an international guarantee that the peninsula would be kept free of nuclear weapons. Through such maneuvers, Pyongyang effectively derailed the promised mutual inspection in June.

South Korean fears about North Korea's nuclear weapons program were reinforced by IAEA Director General Hans Blix, who issued a report in June based

on his tour of Yongbyon in May that said North Korea had already produced plutonium through nuclear reprocessing and was also constructing a plant for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The construction of a facility of this kind clearly violates Article 3 of the Joint Declaration. Such a finding, together with the United States intelligence community's assessment of North Korea's nuclear program, has confirmed Seoul's suspicion that Pyongyang has continued its program to develop nuclear arms. North Korea has contended, however, that its nuclear research has been conducted for peaceful purposes, and that there is no real urgency for mutual inspection of nuclear facilities since North Korea has signed and has ratified the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Against this background, Seoul warned Pyongyang in June to stop the construction of its nuclear reprocessing plant and accept mutual inspection. South Korean Unification Minister Choi Ho-Joong reaffirmed the official position that there would be no substantial economic exchanges or cooperation with North Korea until the nuclear issue was settled, and that development of south-north economic exchanges should parallel progress on other issues, including the reunion of divided family members and politico-military accommodation. Thus when North Korean Deputy Prime Minister Kim Dal-Hyon urged South Korean participation in joint ventures in the north during his visit to Seoul in July, South Korean officials told him there would be none until the nuclear issue was resolved.

North Korea's decision in August to cancel the exchange of home visits by separated relatives also angered South Koreans. Pyongyang has long opposed Seoul's calls for family reunions, and many from the south believe this stems from northern fears of "ideological contamination" from contacts with South Koreans. Even after the signing of the Basic Agreement, Pyongyang ruled out such a possibility until substantial progress could be made in implementing the inter-Korean accords. At the seventh round of the prime ministers' talks held in Seoul in May, however, North Korean Prime Minister Yon modified Pyongyang's original position by proposing exchange visits by 100 senior citizens and 70 performing artists from each side in mid-August.

Pyongyang justified its broken promise on the grounds that South Korea had refused to repatriate Lee In-Mo, a North Korean army officer detained in the country, and that it was conducting a joint military exercise with the United States called "Focus Lens." Despite Seoul's willingness to repatriate Lee and others in exchange for South Korean fishermen and commercial airline crew members detained in North Korea, Pyongyang unilaterally canceled the home visits scheduled for August.

Pyongyang's stepped-up propaganda activities against Seoul, which violate the Basic Agreement, have further

disturbed Seoul. Since ratification of the agreement in February, Pyongyang's radio broadcasts have increasingly denounced the South Korean government, calling it, among other things, "the antiunification fascist regime," and "the puppet regime"; it has also slandered President Roh and Kim Young-Sam, the ruling Democratic Liberal party's nominee in this year's presidential election, and urged South Koreans to engage in antigovernment actions.

Finally, North Korea has persistently demanded one-sided concessions from the south, such as the abrogation of the National Security Law, the release of pro-North Korean citizens serving jail sentences, and the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea. From the early 1950s the Kim Il-Sung regime identified the United States as its principal foe and United States troops stationed in Korea under the mutual security pact with South Korea as the largest single obstacle to reunification; the removal of the American troops from the south had been North Korea's top foreign policy objective. The fact that despite apparent changes in stance North Korea is pushing the last demand, along with the other demands, cannot but lead South Korea to doubt that Pyongyang has given up on spreading communism southward.

Many conservative leaders in the south are sure North Korea did not sign the south-north accords ratified in February in good faith, and that it has not altered its basic objective of communizing the south. In their view, Pyongyang's overtures toward the south are simply a tactical move to get it through its current economic crisis and to smooth the transition of power from Kim Il-Sung to his son, Kim Jong-Il. Some South Korean journalists, on the other hand, believe that Pyongyang has decided not to deal with Roh, a lame-duck leader, but to wait until after the South Korean presidential election to be held this month. At any rate, unless North Korea demonstrates its willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons development program, one cannot expect much further progress in negotiations on normalizing relations.

In an attempt to break the stalemate, the eighth round of talks between the prime ministers was held in Pyongyang on September 15–18. South and North Korea signed three supplementary agreements to the Basic Agreement; these deal with reconciliation, nonaggression, and exchanges and cooperation. As a result, several joint committees became operational in November. The supplementary agreements are unfinished products in that they assigned a number of unresolved issues concerning reconciliation and nonaggression to several joint committees for further discussion, including the Joint Committee on Reconciliation, which was

to be established by October 15. Unfortunately, however, there was no progress on such issues as mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and exchange visits of divided family members between the two Koreas. The talks ended with an agreement to hold the ninth round of the prime ministers' talks in Seoul on December 21–24.

STILL DIVIDED

The lack of real progress in implementing the accords has also dampened any expectations of early reunification through the ongoing dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang. The signing of the Basic Agreement initially aroused a great deal of hope in many Koreans for a speedy, peaceful reunification of their divided land. This was natural in the wake of the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Many believed the two Koreas were on the right track toward reunification in the wake of the signing of the Basic Agreement. Optimism, however, has gradually given way to skepticism or downright pessimism as North Korean recalcitrance effectively stalled the reconciliation process this summer.

Even though North and South Korea agreed to the three principles of independent, democratic, and peaceful reunification in the 1972 Joint Statement, they have remained poles apart with respect to the specific formula to be used. In general, South Korea has advocated a gradual approach, with exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural, and humanitarian fields that are intended to build mutual confidence and lead to broader political understanding and cooperation. In addition, it has advocated the creation of a "Korean Commonwealth" on the peninsula as a way station before the establishment of a unified democratic republic.

North Korea has envisioned a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" to be brought into being through a top-down strategy involving national conferences and high-level negotiations. By last year Kim Il-Sung had toned down his anti-Seoul stance and had begun to advocate confederation on the basis of "one nation, two systems, and two governments."⁴

In view of the antithetical ideologies of the two Koreas, the conflicting claims of Seoul and Pyongyang to legitimacy, and the high level of military capability on both sides, it is unrealistic to look for the formation of either the confederal republic or the commonwealth until Seoul and Pyongyang overcome their deep-seated mistrust and animosity toward each other. Therefore, reconciliation, arms control and arms reduction, and cooperative exchanges between the two Koreas are necessary in order to bring about reunification through peaceful means—which is why full implementation of the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration is so important.

⁴John Q. Blodgett, "Korea: Exploring Paths to Peace and Reunification," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992, p. 176.

Since no specific reunification formula is incorporated in the Basic Agreement, the two sides would have to work out a mutually acceptable plan following the successful implementation of the main provisions of the south-north accords. This would probably mean that a considerable period of time would elapse before reunification.

To be sure, one cannot rule out the possibility of a reunification in which the south “absorbs” the north in the German fashion. Speculation about this was rife in the wake of German reunification. Should the Kim Il-Sung dictatorship collapse as a result of widespread popular discontent and uprisings or a military coup, such a contingency might still develop in Korea; however, in view of political realities in North Korea—a regimented and isolated society under a Stalinist totalitarian dictatorship—it is unlikely in the near future. Besides, the high cost of German reunification for West Germany tends to make South Korea hesitant about embracing such an approach, since it is not as rich as West Germany. Estimates for the cost of Korean reunification range from \$170 billion to more than

\$300 billion over several years. Moreover, because of the ongoing talks between south and north, Seoul has officially disavowed any intention of seeking a German-style reunification, while Pyongyang has publicly shown that it is opposed to reunification by absorption.

Under the circumstances, the best approach to peaceful reunification is through an incremental process, advancing from national reconciliation and cooperation to the ultimate goal, as the two Koreas seemed to have decided in the Basic Agreement. In order to create a foundation for the working out of a mutually acceptable reunification formula—be it a commonwealth or a confederation—that can institutionalize peaceful coexistence and prepare for reunification, full implementation of the south-north accords is essential. To break the current stalemate in negotiations, Pyongyang must accept mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and abandon any attempt to develop a nuclear weapons program. Until it takes these steps, it is unrealistic to expect any real progress toward the peaceful reunification of Korea. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON EAST ASIA

Trial After Triumph:

East Asia After the Cold War

By W. E. Odom. Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1992.

154 pp., \$12.95.

As a sort of handbook for avoiding an East Asian version of Yugoslavia, *Trial After Triumph* provides a thorough analysis of the balance of power in East Asia as well as well-founded predictions of its future.

In clear, direct prose, the authors (fully half this book is written by Andrew Y. Yan, who has one chapter on China and one on Japan, and Perry Wood, who focuses on the Koreas) clearly mark where the strengths and weaknesses lie in the links among the East Asian nations and where danger and chaos are most surely lurking in the near future.

It may be comforting that the authors have found that every nation except North Korea has a stake in maintaining the status quo in the region. Given what they call an environment free of "natural disasters" such as a worldwide depression, they envision relative stability, with the United States playing power-broker. The role the United States should play only appears to have diminished with the Soviet threat eliminated, the authors believe, and any serious reduction of United States military power in the region would create a temptation for adventurism and heighten tensions between states.

Regardless of any moral reason to remain engaged in East Asia—such as to prevent the sort of bloodletting currently occurring in the Balkans—the United States has found itself the only military power intact in the region at the end of the cold war. Given that Russia and China are out of the picture for at least the short term, the Koreas and Japan are the powers that could significantly alter the region's security. The prescription offered for maintaining harmony is surprising since Odom and company suggest that no major new framework is needed to enhance United States-East Asian relations, but simply that the existing one be strengthened and adapted to post-cold war realities.

With regard to Japan, the authors repeatedly warn that short-term "Japan bashing" on the part of United States politicians could seriously damage United States interests in the region by fostering mistrust and resentment. Especially with what seems to be the inevitable reunification of the Koreas and Pyongyang's drive to acquire nuclear power, Japan more than ever needs assurances from its long-standing ally that it need not rearm in the near future. Comparing Japan's importance in East Asia with that of Germany in

Europe, they stress the need to take into account the country's enormous security role as well as its economic ability.

A unified Korea plays a pivotal part in every scenario the authors develop about how the new state will begin to search for patrons in the post-cold war world. How it is accepted by the United States and the rest of the world and how Japan reacts will be critical in determining the security of the region.

Sean Patrick Murphy

The End of the Cold War in Northeast Asia

Edited by Stuart Harris and James Cotton. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991. 286 pp., \$18.95.

Placing Northeast Asia in the context of a changing global economy and renewed interdependence, the 20 authors in this book detail much of the history of several nations, including their internal dynamics as well as their foreign policy objectives. This overview of the region with country-specific studies offers the reader a solid grounding in the issues that will come into play during the 1990s.

One of the suggestions to come from this book is that organizations such as the United Nations must metamorphose from predominantly Eurocentric bodies into truly global institutions. In the final chapter, Stuart Harris writes, "No institution in the region compares with NATO, the Warsaw Pact or the . . . CSCE. . . . In the longer term, something similar to . . . a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia—is needed." Only by developing such a mature environment to prevent or buffer the inevitable collisions in the region can the world hope to avoid calamity in an area crucial to its economy and security.

Published in 1991, the book is already dated, referring to the Soviet Union as a viable political entity. Nevertheless, *The End of the Cold War in Northeast Asia* provides a suitable framework for understanding the issues that will press for the world's attention in the near future.

S. P. M.

Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity

By Martin Smith. London: Zed Books, 1991. 492 pp., \$69.95, cloth; \$25.00, paper.

Martin Smith, who has reported extensively for *The Guardian*, *The Times*, and human rights groups, has written an exceptional book. *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* is reportage at its best: expansive in concept, detailed in execution, passionate in its search for the truth about contemporary Burmese history. In its well-documented pages, it seeks to lift the veil from

one of the world's most isolated and hermetically sealed countries.

Smith painstakingly examines the causes and effects of the pervasive conflict involving several ethnic groups in the country, and cuts through the patriotic slogans of juntas to expose the rise of fascism. In doing so, he reveals a society torn apart over the past four decades of military repression. The totalitarians are mortgaging the nation's natural resources to the gunrunners of capitalism and communism in order to ensure their own survival.

Rafique Kathwari

A Fragile Relationship:

The United States and China since 1972

By Harry Harding. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992. 458 pp., \$38.95, cloth; \$16.95, paper.

In this fine new book, Harry Harding, a senior fellow at Brookings, provides a comprehensive, balanced, and well-written assessment of relations between the United States and China in the last 20 years. His analysis is filled with the details not only of American decision making, but also the policy debate in China. Although the author's conservative bent is betrayed by his persistent use of Peking rather than Beijing for China's capital (whereas pinyin transliteration is otherwise used for reference to mainland places and people), the coverage is both fair and rounded, with only a few factual errors (former Congressman Stephen Solarz would no doubt be surprised to find himself referred to as the Republican representative from New York).

Drawing on available literature, public opinion polls, newspaper accounts, and government documents, Harding meticulously recreates the atmosphere of the policy debates at each of what he considers the four stages of the bilateral relationship (1949–1969, 1969–early 1980s, mid-1980s–1989, and post-1989), and reviews the possible outcomes of the policy choices that were under consideration. With this foundation, his final chapters propose alternative scenarios for the future of United States–China relations and guidelines for United States policy that are grounded and reasonable.

In spite of his obvious admiration for how Richard Nixon advanced relations with China, Harding does not spare George Bush for his handling of foreign policy in general and his policy toward China in particular (though the two presidents' approaches show definite similarities). Bush was unable to create the desired spin on his management of United States–China relations after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis and, though there may be some positive aspects to his dogged insistence on personal stewardship and high-level contacts throughout his tenure, the president did not adequately assuage the American public's perception that he was duplicitous in his pronouncements on United States policy toward China after the suppres-

sion of the democracy movement. Harding is quite clear when he says that United States policy is doomed to fail if it does not clarify its objectives and move beyond both triangular strategic thinking and cold war analysis. To begin to develop an informed and sensible course for United States relations with the last Communist giant, United States policymakers—and the interested general public—have a good place to start in this volume.

Debra E. Soled

Perspectives on Kashmir:

The Roots of Conflict in South Asia

Edited by Raju G. C. Thomas. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. 422 pp., \$42.95.

This book is not just another analysis of a political problem somewhere in the Himalayas. It is an emotionally charged tragic story told in 20 soul-searching essays by 21 distinguished thinkers: 7 Indians, 7 Pakistanis, a Briton, an American, and even—surprise!—5 Kashmiris. The balance of power is thus maintained—or if you will, explained. The editor, Raju G. C. Thomas, alternates with the arrangement of the essays, generally following an Indian perspective with a Pakistani one. If you are from the Indian subcontinent, and especially the Kashmir Valley, you may find yourself shifting from anger to elation to expletives and back to anger.

Considering the passions aroused by the Kashmir problem, Thomas must be commended for his achievement in bringing together different ways of seeing it. “The perceptions of the Kashmir problem are not those of consensus but of dissent,” says Thomas in his introductory essay, confessing that his views are shaped by his own background and experience. This book is aimed specifically at policymakers but should also attract a wider audience. Proceed with caution, however: subjective perceptions often prejudice reality.

R. K.

Brother Number One:

A Political Biography of Pol Pot

By David P. Chandler. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. 270 pp., \$24.95.

In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia. The country's cities were emptied and the people forced into the countryside. “The revolutionary organization [then] embarked on the program of social transformation that affected every aspect of Cambodian life. Money, markets, and private property were abolished. Schools, universities, and Buddhist monasteries were closed. No publishing was allowed; the postal system was abolished; freedom of movement, exchanging information, personal adornment, and leisure activities were curtailed. Punishments for infractions were severe, and repeat offenders were imprisoned under harsh conditions or killed. . . . Nearly all [the

people] became peasants and were made to wear identical black cotton clothing." In the years that followed as many as 1 million Cambodians died.

Such was the work of Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, a shadowy figure whose name has become synonymous with totalitarianism. In this biography, David Chandler, who has written extensively on Cambodia's history, tries to illuminate the life of Pol Pot, the revolutionary name chosen by Saloth Sar, a former schoolteacher who studied philosophy in France and returned to Cambodia to remake the country into a Communist utopia. It is a daunting task, and Chandler notes his frustrations, saying he sometimes felt Pol Pot was observing him in his research. The result, however, is a highly readable account of the man who has influenced Cambodian politics for almost two decades and who even today may still derail the United Nations-brokered peace accord in the country.

William W. Finan, Jr.

MISCELLANEOUS

The Soviet Nationality Reader:

The Disintegration in Context

Edited by Rachel Denber. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. 635 pp., \$52.00, cloth; \$21.50, paper.

Denber's book could not be more timely. This impressive collection of essays takes into account almost 20 years of thinking by as many authors on the "problem" of the diverse nationalities who live in what was the Soviet Union.

The essays contained in this reader give a wealth of insight into how the question of ethnicity was dealt with in the Soviet Union from Lenin to Gorbachev. They treat issues ranging from the ambiguity of Soviet policy regarding the country's diverse nationalities—keeping a tight rein on the republics while espousing democratic principles—to the identity crises affecting much of the population. By shedding light on their political and economic structures, the authors offer a strong historical perspective on the promise and peril faced by the former Soviet republics as well as providing context for the trouble currently brewing in places like Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia.

S. P. M.

Changing Our Ways: America and the New World

By the Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World. Distributed by the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. 90 pp., \$9.95.

Charged with the task of outlining how the United States should act in the post-cold war world, the authors of this report (a distinguished group of centrists) dutifully state that existing policies cannot be simply tinkered with—bold initiatives are essential. The initiatives the group recommends include a call for

NATO to be "rethought" (and to somehow work with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe); the need for Japan, the United States, and the European Community to "manage" the world economy; and a lukewarm endorsement of aid to eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

These and many of the other ideas expressed in *Changing Our Ways* are not bold; they are prime examples of a committee-speak that offers watered-down policy proposals for a world that is struggling to understand what has happened since 1989. This is most apparent in the discussion of what to do about the former Communist states. The cold war ended with a whimper, and the victors fail to realize, as historian John Lewis Gaddis has noted, that leaving the defeated to fend for themselves—as was the case with Germany after World War I and is the case with the former Communist countries today—can only lead to the turmoil that breeds war. The commission seemed to be aware of this, yet offered no plan that would meet such a challenge; instead we get, "The Commission strongly endorses a major U.S. commitment to [the transition from communism to the market]." This is vision?

The report does offer a look at the broader range of issues the United States will face in the coming years; besides global economic and security concerns, there is discussion of environmental problems, population and refugee increases, and energy needs (one of the commission's recommendations is a call for an increased gasoline tax in the United States). Most significant, however, is the commission's understanding that domestic concerns are just as important as foreign threats. The plea that America has to be strong socially and economically is hardly radical, but it is a first step toward understanding that the national security state that evolved during the cold war must be dismantled and appropriate ends and means stressed in dealing with post-cold war dangers.

W. W. F.

The End of the Cold War:

Its Meanings and Implications

Edited by Michael J. Hogan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 294 pp., \$44.95, cloth; \$13.95, paper.

So much has been said and written about the end of the cold war that it is difficult to gain perspective on the events that shaped it and its end. This excellent volume offers a remedy. The authors run the gamut from Noam Chomsky to Samuel Wells, Jr., and the interpretations of its beginnings and what has happened since 1989 fall along the same political spectrum. The writing is lively, lucid, intelligent, and accessible; the points of view refreshing and insightful.

W. W. F. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

OCTOBER 1992

INTERNATIONAL

European Community (EC)

Oct. 29—Italy ratifies the Community's Maastricht treaty on political and monetary union; the vote in the Chamber of Deputies is 403 to 46, with 18 abstentions; the Senate has already approved the treaty.

Middle East Peace Conference

Oct. 8—Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announces that Israel has withdrawn its long-standing objection to participation in the peace talks by Palestinians from outside the Israeli-occupied territories.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *Intl, Yugoslav Crisis*; *US*)

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl, Yugoslav Crisis*; *Angola*; *El Salvador*; *Mozambique*; *Sudan*; *Vietnam*)

Oct. 2—The Security Council votes, 14 to 0, to seize \$800-million-worth of Iraqi assets outside the country to help pay the estimated \$100 billion Iraq owes the UN and victims of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait; China abstains from voting.

Oct. 6—In a unanimous vote, the Security Council agrees to set up a war crimes commission to collect information on atrocities in the newly independent Balkan states.

Oct. 9—The Security Council votes, 14 to 0, with China abstaining, to ban all military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Oct. 12—In Geneva, special envoy to Somalia Mohammed Sahnoun says the UN is beginning a program that will triple deliveries of relief supplies to Somalia, where as many as 2 million of the approximately 5 million citizens are in danger of dying from starvation or disease.

Oct. 13—The 15 Security Council members unanimously adopt a resolution demanding that Cambodia's Khmer Rouge follow the disarmament procedures it agreed to in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements as well as allow UN officials to enter Khmer Rouge-occupied areas to register voters for the planned May 1993 elections.

Oct. 22—A UN spokesman says the Iraqi government has agreed to allow 300 UN guards in northern Iraq and \$220-million-worth of food, fuel, and medical supplies to be delivered to the country's Kurds.

Oct. 29—Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accepts special envoy Sahnoun's resignation; the UN officially rebuked Sahnoun recently for saying it had reacted slowly to the crisis in Somalia.

Yugoslav Crisis

(See also *Intl, UN*; *US*)

Oct. 1—In Washington, Greek Foreign Minister Michalis Papakonstantinou says that under the terms of a UN agreement, Greece will resume oil shipments to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia; Macedonian officials say that Greece imposed a total embargo on cross-border trade in August and that Yugoslavia has barred food deliveries.

A medical crisis center in the capital city of Sarajevo

reports that 14,364 people have been killed, 125,784 wounded, and 57,000 listed as missing in Bosnia and Herzegovina since fighting began in March.

Oct. 2—*The New York Times* reports that as many as 500 Muslims have been forcibly evacuated from their homes in Grbavica, a suburb of Sarajevo, in the last 2 days by Serb militias, despite Serb assertions that "ethnic cleansing" operations have ceased.

Oct. 3—The US resumes relief flights to the Sarajevo airport, which was closed after the September 3 downing of an Italian cargo plane near Sarajevo by what UN investigators say may have been American-made Stinger missiles fired by Croat militias.

Oct. 5—Serb forces surrounding Sarajevo fire incendiary artillery shells on residential neighborhoods, killing 21 people and wounding dozens.

Oct. 6—Serb militiamen—backed by the Yugoslav army—begin occupying the Bosnian town of Bosanski Brod.

Oct. 10—Government officials in Gradacac, Bosnia, say 30 Yugoslav aircraft bombed the town, killing 19 people and wounding 34; Sarajevo and Zagreb radio report other air strikes on Croat-populated villages near the Bosnian town of Brcko and say that Bosnian forces shot down 1 Yugoslav MiG fighter.

One Ukrainian soldier is killed and 3 are wounded when their UN troop carrier hits a land mine in Sarajevo's western suburbs.

Oct. 13—Government officials in Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo, which is populated mainly by ethnic Albanians, say 15 people were arrested in Pristina, the capital, when Serbian police clashed with demonstrators; Agim Hyseni, who heads the protest organizing committee, says police sealed off at least 5 towns and beat 10 protesters during the demonstrations; recent unrest in the province stems from student demands for Albanian-language education and the right to develop their own curriculum.

Oct. 14—Cyrus Vance, the chief UN mediator for the Balkan conflict, says only \$198 million of the \$282 million in international aid requested for the area has been offered, and that food pledges cover needs only up to November 1.

Oct. 16—NATO AWAC planes begin surveillance flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the enforcement of the ban on military flights imposed by the UN October 9.

Oct. 18—Heavy artillery shelling of Sarajevo kills 20 people and injures more than 130; the shelling also destroys the city's remaining flour mill.

Remzija Kobilic, a civil defense official in the Bosnian town of Travnik, says that since May, 45,000 refugees have fled from the mountains in the north in an attempt to escape Serb aggression and "ethnic cleansing" operations.

Oct. 20—In Geneva, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic agree to set up jointly controlled customs posts along their borders; to allow neutral observers to monitor all airports under their control; to form a committee to discuss trade and refugee issues; and to open liaison offices in Zagreb and Belgrade.

The last Yugoslav army troops leave the Prevlaka Peninsula, fulfilling a September 30 agreement between Tudjman and Cosic.

Oct. 21—The UN airlift to Sarajevo is suspended because of heavy fighting west of the capital between Croats and Muslims.

Oct. 22—The UN military commander in Sarajevo, Major General Philippe Morillon, says repair crews have restored electricity and running water to most of the capital.

The US delivers to the UN information on alleged atrocities committed during the Yugoslav crisis that it has compiled from US diplomatic personnel and interviews with refugees and journalists; included are accounts of the killing of 400 men, women, and children by Serbs in Bosnia in 3 separate incidents in July, August, and September.

Oct. 27—*The New York Times* reports that Croat militias have attacked Bosnian army troops in the Bosnian cities and towns of Mostar, Vitez, Novi Travnik, and Gornji Vakuf in the last week; the Bosnian government says an estimated 300 Muslims were wounded or killed in a Croat tank and artillery attack on Prozor 3 days ago.

Oct. 29—Prozor's Croat mayor, Mijo Jozic, says 6 Muslims were killed and 68 wounded in the Croat attack.

Oct. 30—UN officials say as many as 30,000 Muslim and Croat refugees are fleeing Jajce after the town's capture by Serb forces yesterday; Serbs began their assault on Jajce October 24.

In Zagreb, Croatian police expel more than 50 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina; the government has repeatedly assured the UN that the Bosnians have protected refugee status; more than 650,000 war refugees are already in Croatia.

ALGERIA

Oct. 15—The government says the fundamentalist opposition group, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), is responsible for the August 26 bombing of the Algiers airport, in which at least 10 people were killed and 124 wounded.

ANGOLA

Oct. 6—The National Electoral Commission, the body overseeing the general election for which polling took place September 29–30, announces it will withhold the results pending a recount. In a radio broadcast on October 3, Jonas Savimbi—a candidate for president, and leader of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which signed a cease-fire in the country's 16-year civil war last May—accused the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola of systematic electoral fraud.

Oct. 15—In Luanda, fighting between government troops and UNITA forces after an explosion at an ammunition dump near the international airport leaves at least 13 people dead.

Oct. 17—Official election results released today show that Eduardo dos Santos, leader of the governing party, received 49.6% of the vote in balloting for president, and Savimbi 40.1%, forcing a runoff. In the balloting for parliament, the governing party captured nearly 54% of the vote and UNITA 30.1%. A UN report terms the election "generally free and fair."

State radio reports heavy fighting in the town of Huambo in the central highlands, where Savimbi and top UNITA officials have been staying since the election.

Oct. 31—Shortly after the government and UNITA break off talks, heavy fighting resumes in Luanda; dozens of people have been reported killed in battles over the last 2 days in Luanda and Huambo.

BOLIVIA

Oct. 12—Thousands of Quechua and Aymara gather in La Paz to protest celebration of the 500th anniversary of Christo-

pher Columbus's arrival in the Americas; a statue of Queen Isabella of Spain is bombed.

BRAZIL

Oct. 2—Former Vice President Itamar Augusto Franco becomes acting president; he is expected to remain in the post at least until the conclusion of the Senate impeachment trial of President Fernando Collor de Mello; on September 29, the Chamber of Deputies voted to impeach Collor after he had been accused of involvement in influence-peddling and bribery schemes while in office.

Oct. 4—Police officials say an October 2 riot in Carandiru Prison in São Paulo claimed the lives of 111 inmates and wounded 35, while injuring 32 police officers; Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a coordinator for the human rights group Americas Watch, says police took part in "deliberate and systematic executions" of prisoners during the riot.

Oct. 6—A spokesman for Justice Minister Mauricio Correa says about 200 inmates were killed in the October 2 Carandiru Prison riot in São Paulo.

BULGARIA

Oct. 28—The non-Communist government led by Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov resigns after losing a vote of confidence in parliament, 120 to 111; Dimitrov's cabinet has been criticized for the country's failing economy and accused of selling arms to the warring parties in the Yugoslav crisis.

CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, UN*)

CANADA

Oct. 28—Official results from an October 26 national referendum on constitutional reform show voters rejected the proposed changes 54% to 45.5%; the package included greater political autonomy for the province of Quebec.

CHINA

(See also *US*)

Oct. 12—The 14th congress of the Chinese Communist party opens in Beijing; in the keynote speech, intended to set out party policy for the next 5 years, party General Secretary Jiang Zemin stresses the need for a free-market "revolution"; "Poverty," he says, "is not socialism."

Oct. 16—*Wen Wei Po*, a Hong Kong newspaper controlled by the Chinese Communist party, reports that 8 of the Politburo's 14 members have resigned, including President Yang Shangkun and Defense Minister Qin Jiwei.

Oct. 18—In ceremonial voting, delegates to the congress select the 189 full members and 130 alternates for the party's Central Committee; nearly half the current members are deprived of their seats.

Oct. 19—The party announces 3 appointments to the Politburo's 7-member Standing Committee, China's highest executive body. Zhu Rongji, the former mayor of Shanghai; General Liu Huaqing; and Hu Jintao, the party secretary in Tibet, join the committee, while hard-line leaders Song Ping and Yao Yilin are dropped.

Oct. 23—Reacting to an October 7 British statement, Lu Ping, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, says that if Britain institutes political changes allowing for more representative government in Hong Kong, China will disman-

Oct. 24—Dissident student leader Shen Tong is deported; Shen was taken into police custody in Beijing September 1

after he returned from exile in the US to open a local chapter of the Democracy for China Fund.

Oct. 30—The government says it is expelling Leung Wai-min, a reporter for the newspaper *The Hong Kong Express*, because she bribed a government employee to obtain for her an advance copy of Jiang's speech to the party congress and other documents.

COLOMBIA

Oct. 7—Roberto Escobar, who escaped from prison July 21 with his brother, drug trafficker Pablo Escobar, surrenders to authorities, along with 2 ranking members of the Medellín drug cartel.

Oct. 26—An army court-martial convicts 4 soldiers and 3 non-commissioned officers on charges that they aided Pablo Escobar in his prison break.

Oct. 28—Security officials in Medellín kill Brance Muñoz Mosquera, Escobar's military commander.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

(See also US)

Oct. 1—The Russian government begins distribution of vouchers worth some 1.4 trillion rubles (\$4.5 billion) to the country's 148 million citizens; every citizen will receive a voucher worth 10,000 rubles (about \$40) that they can trade, sell to Russians or foreigners, or, starting December 1, invest in firms covered by the plan.

The Ukrainian parliament, voting 295 to 6, approves a no-confidence motion against the government, forcing it to step down; Prime Minister Vitold Fokin, whose economic policies have been widely criticized, resigned yesterday.

Oct. 2—Russia's Constitutional Court bars former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev from leaving the country until he obeys a summons to testify at a trial on the legality of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's 1991 outlawing of the Communist party and confiscation of its assets.

Oct. 7—Yeltsin signs a decree transferring the property of the Gorbachev Foundation, located in and near Moscow, to the Russian Financial Academy.

Oct. 13—President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine names as prime minister Leonid Kuchma, the head of Yuzhmash, a corporation that produced tactical nuclear missiles.

Oct. 19—Reciprocating for cuts in testing by the US and France, Yeltsin signs a decree extending Russia's moratorium on nuclear weapons tests until July 1993.

Oct. 20—Russia's Defense Ministry announces it is temporarily suspending the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states because it lacks housing at home for them; 40% of the approximately 130,000 troops stationed in the 3 countries in 1991 have been pulled out.

Oct. 21—In a 114-59 vote, Russia's standing parliament, the Russian Supreme Soviet, rejects Yeltsin's call for postponement until spring of the session of the Congress of People's Deputies scheduled to begin December 1; broad emergency powers granted to the president by parliament last year expire December 1.

Oct. 24—In Tajikistan's capital, Dushanbe, fighters said to be from the southern province of Kulyab, the homeland of former President Rakhmon Nabiyev, occupy government buildings and the offices of the Islamic religious leader. Coup leader Safarali Kendzhayev, ex-chief of security forces, announces that his group wants to "restore legality that was trampled upon. . . by Islamic fundamentalists," who last month forced Nabiyev, a former Communist, to resign; Kendzhayev says he has requested that acting President Akbarshah Iskandarov remain in office. More than 2,000 people have died in 6 months of civil war.

Oct. 25—Colonel Alidzhon Solibayev, leader of the pro-Iskandarov National Security Committee, reports the partial withdrawal of rebels from government buildings in Dushanbe after Iskandarov agrees to call an emergency session of parliament. The Interfax news agency reports that "hundreds" of people have died in 2 days of fighting in the former republic capital.

Oct. 28—Yeltsin signs a decree outlawing the National Salvation Front, an ultra-nationalist and Communist group that held its founding congress last weekend. In a separate action, Yeltsin signs an order banning armed units not under his command or that of the Interior Ministry, including the 5,000-member "Cardinal's Guard" controlled by Ruslan Khasbulatov, who is the chairman of the Russian parliament.

Oct. 29—Yeltsin signs a presidential decree suspending the withdrawal of troops from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that cites concerns about infringements of the human rights of ethnic Russians living there; the decree effectively overturns a September 8 agreement with Lithuania to complete the withdrawal by next August 31.

ECUADOR

Oct. 12—Thousands of Quechua demonstrate in Quito, marking the quincentennial of Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas; 2 indigenous people have been killed and dozens wounded over the past several days while participating in land occupations and roadblocks.

EGYPT

Oct. 17—In Cairo, crowds of people left homeless by an October 12 earthquake clash with riot police; the quake killed 552 people, injured nearly 10,000, and destroyed the homes of 3,000 families.

Oct. 21—Two gunmen fire on a tour bus outside Dairut in southern Egypt, killing 1 British tourist and wounding 2 others; the extremist Islamic Group recently issued a statement warning foreigners not to travel to historical sites in Luxor; on October 1 masked gunmen fired on a Nile River cruise ship carrying 140 German tourists, wounding 3 Egyptian crew members.

Oct. 25—A man stabs 3 Russian tourists in Port Said, critically wounding 1 of them; Muslim militants have said they will attack tourists until the government frees their jailed colleagues.

EL SALVADOR

Oct. 16—Government and Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) representatives announce they have accepted a UN-backed land redistribution plan that will give lots of 3.5 to 12 acres each to 7,500 former rebels, 15,000 demobilized government troops, and 25,000 peasant families.

Oct. 19—At least 38 skeletons—most identified as those of children—are found buried in a shallow grave in El Mozote, a village where almost 800 residents were reportedly massacred by US-trained Salvadoran soldiers in December 1981 during the guerrilla war.

Oct. 26—FMLN leaders say they have agreed to a UN plan to demobilize the group's 5,000 remaining troops by December 15.

Oct. 28—In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, President Alfredo Cristiani says he will suspend demobilization of the military until the FMLN destroys more of its weapons, as required by the UN-sponsored peace plan.

ESTONIA

(See CIS)

GEORGIA

Oct. 3—Georgian warplanes and helicopter gunships bombard the Black Sea resort of Gagra, a former government stronghold that separatist Abkhazian forces and Muslim militants captured yesterday.

Oct. 17—Final results from parliamentary elections held October 11 show 96% of ballots cast for the post of speaker of parliament went to Eduard Shevardnadze, the head of the ruling State Council, who ran unopposed; Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua was also reelected.

GERMANY

Oct. 3—On the 2d anniversary of German reunification, police clash with leftist and rightist demonstrators in several cities and arrest more than 65; tens of thousands of people attend anti-racism rallies in Berlin, Frankfurt, and other cities.

GREECE

(See Intl, Yugoslav Crisis)

GUYANA

Oct. 10—Final results from the October 6 presidential elections show that former Marxist Cheddi Jagan won with 54% of the vote, ousting socialist President Hugh Desmond Hoyte, *The Economist* reports; in Georgetown, the capital, police gunfire kills 2 people during rioting and looting by Hoyte supporters who charged Jagan backers with electoral fraud.

INDIA

Oct. 13—*The New York Times* reports government casualty figures for factional fighting in the year ended August 31; 4,900 people—2,700 civilians, 1,900 insurgents, and 300 security personnel—were killed in Punjab; 1,044 civilians were killed in Kashmir, along with 1,300 guerrillas and 149 soldiers and police officers.

Oct. 16—The Supreme Court permits the disbursement of \$470 million in damages paid by Union Carbide to victims of the poisonous gas leak at Carbide's plant in Bhopal in 1984, and to victims' survivors; 4,000 people died and many others were injured in the accident.

IRAN

Oct. 15—The newspaper *Keyhan* reports 1 man was killed and 4 people were wounded in Teheran when a bomb the man was planting exploded; the exiled opposition group Mujahedin Khalq has claimed responsibility for a small bomb set off October 10 near the shrine of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Teheran that caused minor damage.

IRAQ

(See also Intl, UN; Kuwait)

Oct. 2—Approximately 10,000 Iraqi Kurds backed by Turkish warplanes begin an offensive in northern Iraq to surround members of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers party (PKK), a separatist group whose guerrillas have carried out attacks in Turkey.

Oct. 10—Citing "confusion" as the reason for his arrest, Iraqi officials release to UN officials an American working to clear mines along Kuwait's border with Iraq; the American was taken to Baghdad at gunpoint by Iraqi security personnel for allegedly straying over the border 2 days ago.

Oct. 26—Iraqi Kurds have captured the main PKK stronghold in a recent offensive that began October 23, according to the Kurdistan Democratic party; Kurdish regional parliament member Salam Khan says 5 Iraqi Kurds and at least 20 Turkish Kurds have been killed in the most recent offensive.

Oct. 27—PKK rebels have agreed to leave the area along the Iraqi-Turkish border, according to Kurdish regional parliament member Barham Salih.

ISRAEL

(See also Intl, Middle East Peace Conference)

Oct. 1—In the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers fire on a crowd of demonstrators, wounding 2 people, after dozens of Palestinian youths threw stones at them; the protest was in support of as many as 3,000 Palestinian prisoners who have been on a hunger strike since September 27.

Oct. 7—In the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers fire plastic and rubber bullets into a crowd of several thousand Palestinian protesters, wounding at least 90; the demonstrators, many of whom threw stones at the soldiers, were demonstrating in support of the hunger strikers.

Oct. 10—One Palestinian is killed and 47 are wounded as Israeli soldiers and demonstrators clash in the Israeli-occupied territories and in Jerusalem.

Oct. 11—In Gaza, 1 Palestinian is killed and 40 protesters are wounded by Israeli soldiers as thousands of Palestinians ignore an all-day curfew imposed by the Israeli army; an Israeli is stabbed to death by Palestinians in a Jewish settlement.

Oct. 14—A Palestinian inmate who had been on a hunger strike dies of a heart attack, Israeli radio reports; the strike was suspended October 11 after Israeli officials agreed to negotiations on the treatment of prisoners.

Oct. 27—Army officials say Israeli artillery, aircraft, and gunboats are attacking Muslim fundamentalist positions across Lebanon for a 2d day in retaliation for the October 25 killing of 5 Israeli soldiers by a bomb planted by Party of God members in Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon; another Israeli soldier was shot to death the same day at a checkpoint in Hebron by Hamas militants; news reports from Lebanon say 13 people have been killed and 11 wounded as a result of the Israeli strikes. Party of God guerrillas today fired 30 rockets into the security zone and northern Israel, killing 2 Lebanese and an Israeli in the town of Qiryat Shemona.

Two Israeli civilians are wounded, 1 critically, in separate attacks by Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and in Gaza.

ITALY

(See also Intl, EC)

Oct. 11—Prime Minister Giuliano Amato's coalition government survives a 303-3 vote of confidence in the lower house of parliament on an \$18-billion tax cut bill.

Oct. 13—In cities throughout the country, 10 million workers (by union estimates) demonstrate against a government economic austerity plan that includes the abolition of traditional wage hikes linked to the inflation rate. Spontaneous strikes have occurred throughout the country since Amato announced the plan September 19.

JAPAN

Oct. 14—Shin Kanemaru, who last month stepped down as head of the largest faction of the governing Liberal Democratic party because of a bribery scandal, resigns from parliament.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *US*)

Oct. 5—President Roh Tae Woo resigns from the Democratic Liberal party; Roh had promised to step down before the establishment of a politically neutral cabinet to ensure a fair December presidential election.

KUWAIT

(See also *Intl*, *UN*; *US*)

Oct. 6—The Interior Ministry releases results from yesterday's election showing 31 opposition candidates won seats in the 50-member National Assembly, 19 of them Islamic candidates; it was the country's 1st election since the emir, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, dismissed parliament, banned political parties, and suspended the constitution in 1986.

Three Kuwaiti policemen are wounded when Iraqi security personnel fire on their post in the demilitarized zone between the 2 countries.

Oct. 12—Government radio announces the emir has appointed his heir, Sheik Saad al-Abdulla al-Sabah, to the post of prime minister.

LATVIA

(See *CIS*)

LEBANON

(See also *Israel*)

Oct. 20—The newly elected parliament chooses Nabih Berri, a former commander of the Shiite Muslim Amal militia, as its speaker.

Oct. 22—President Elias Hrawi names Sunni Muslim billionaire Rafik al-Hariri prime minister.

LIBERIA

Oct. 15—Guerrilla forces loyal to Charles Taylor begin an offensive against the capital city of Monrovia.

Oct. 22—West African peacekeeping forces conduct air and artillery strikes on rebel positions outside Monrovia; the US evacuates 90 Americans from the country; 7,000 West African troops from 7 nations are taking part in the attempt to end the country's civil war.

Oct. 26—Rebels kill 5 people in rocket attacks outside Monrovia; an estimated 12 people have been killed and 344 wounded in the 11-day assault by the guerrillas.

Oct. 31—Roman Catholic Archbishop Michael Francis says 5 American nuns, missing for about 10 days, were shot to death near their convent on the outskirts of Monrovia in an area overrun by troops belonging to Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

LITHUANIA

(See *CIS*)

MEXICO

Oct. 6—Michoacán Governor Eduardo Villaseñor, the Institutional Revolutionary party candidate who won the July 12 gubernatorial elections amid allegations of electoral fraud by Democratic Revolutionary party (PRD) candidate Cristóbal Arias, steps down; Michoacán legislators are expected to choose an interim governor to hold the post while the political crisis remains unresolved.

MOZAMBIQUE

Oct. 4—In Rome, after 2 years of talks on ending a guerrilla war that began in 1976, President Joaquín Chissano and

Afonso Dhlakama, head of the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), sign a peace treaty; a cease-fire will take effect as soon as parliament ratifies the pact; government and rebel troops will disarm under United Nations auspices.

MYANMAR

Oct. 8—The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that as of last month the country's ruling junta has released hundreds of political prisoners since April, reopened all universities and colleges in August, and lifted the overnight curfew and rescinded 2 martial law decrees in September.

PERU

Oct. 7—In a closed military trial, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, founder and leader of the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), is convicted of treason and sentenced to life imprisonment; in Lima, Shining Path guerrillas kill 5 people and wound 5 others after the conviction is announced; Guzmán's defense lawyer says he was not allowed to call witnesses for the defense and was only permitted to meet with his client for 2 10-minute sessions.

Oct. 10—Shining Path guerrillas kill 44 people and wound 15 in the village of Huayao; in Lima, rebels throw 3 grenades at the residence of the US ambassador to Peru, causing little damage.

Oct. 11—Police officials say Shining Path rebels have killed another 8 people over the last 2 days.

PHILIPPINES

(See *US*)

QATAR

Oct. 1—The state news agency reports Saudi troops have captured a Qatari border post at al-Khofous 1 day after a confrontation there left 2 people dead; the report comes only hours after the government suspended a 1965 border agreement with Saudi Arabia.

ROMANIA

Oct. 13—Final results from a runoff held October 11 show that President Ion Iliescu, a former Communist, has won reelection, with 61.4% of the vote, over challenger Emil Constantinescu.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Qatar*)

SOMALIA

(See also *Intl*, *UN*)

Oct. 13—Followers of Siad Barre Morgan, the son-in-law of former President Mohammed Siad Barre, capture the strategic southern town of Bardera after battling troops backing Mohammed Farah Aidid; Bardera is a base for the distribution of food aid to 200,000 people.

Oct. 23—Approximately 100,000 Somalis have died of hunger this year, *The New York Times* reports; it also says the airport in Mogadishu, the capital, was closed this week because of fighting and that relief airlifts to Belet Uen and Bardera have been suspended for 10 days for similar reasons.

Oct. 25—The US cancels its relief flights to Baidoa after 1 of its planes is hit with small-arms fire.

SOUTH AFRICA

- Oct. 19—The African National Congress (ANC) releases a report of an internal investigation that concludes it tortured and held without trial members accused of treason during its exile in other African countries in the 1980s and early 1990s; ANC president Nelson Mandela accepts "collective responsibility" for the human rights violations.
- Oct. 21—In the tricameral segregated parliament, the chamber elected by citizens of Asian extraction vetoes a bill granting amnesty for political crimes committed before October 1990; President F. W. de Klerk says he will override the veto.
- Oct. 24—In Natal province, gunmen kill at least 20 Inkatha Freedom party supporters and wound 27 at a Zulu tribal ceremony.

SRI LANKA

- Oct. 15—About 150 Tamil rebels kill at least 134 people and wound approximately 100, most of them Muslim civilians, in attacks on 3 eastern villages.

SUDAN

- Oct. 1—Rebel groups have killed 3 foreign aid workers and a Norwegian journalist they kidnapped in southern Sudan September 27, *The New York Times* reports.

THAILAND

- Oct. 7—Parliament votes unanimously to revoke the amnesty granted those responsible for the massacre in May of at least 52 people during demonstrations in Bangkok calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Suchinda Kraprayoon.

TURKEY

(See also *Iraq*; *US*)

- Oct. 14—Government troops kill 2 members of the separatist Turkish Kurdistan Workers party in southeastern Turkey; recent fighting in the area has left 22 guerrillas dead.

UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

Great Britain

- Oct. 12—The Irish Republican Army sets off a bomb in a London pub that wounds 5 people, 1 of them seriously. This is the 8th bombing in the last 6 days that the group has taken credit for; 7 people were wounded in the previous attacks.
- Oct. 19—Bowling to public pressure, the government says state-owned British Coal will only close 10 of its operating mines, putting 7,500 miners out of work; on October 13 it announced that it would shut 31 mines at a loss of 30,000 jobs—nearly 75% of the industry's work force.

Hong Kong

(See *China*)

UNITED STATES (US)

(See also *Liberia*; *Somalia*; *Vietnam*)

- Oct. 1—Ross Perot, the billionaire independent presidential candidate who dropped out of the race in July, announces he will resume his presidential campaign.
- Oct. 2—The USS *Saratoga*, an aircraft carrier on a NATO training exercise off the coast of Turkey, fires 2 surface-to-air missiles at the Turkish destroyer *Muavenet*, killing 5 sailors and wounding 14; Navy officials say the incident is accidental and call for an immediate investigation.
- Oct. 8—After 2 days of consultations between Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and South Korean Defense Minister Choi

Sae Chang, the 2 countries announce they will extend a year-old moratorium on the removal of US troops from South Korea because of concern that North Korea is developing a nuclear weapons program; the US, which has 37,400 soldiers in the country, has withdrawn 7,000 in the last 2 years.

The government decommissioned its naval facility in Subic Bay, the Philippines, on September 30, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports.

- Oct. 9—Bush administration officials say Chinese and US trade representatives have reached an agreement that would give some American-made products greater access to Chinese markets in areas such as computers and chemicals.
- Oct. 11—*The New York Times* reports President George Bush signed into law this week a foreign aid bill that allows the US to transfer \$50 million in military equipment to Bosnia and Herzegovina once UN sanctions are removed.

VIETNAM

- Oct. 8—The national assembly has chosen former defense minister Le Duc Anh as the country's president and has reappointed Vo Van Kiet prime minister, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*.
- Oct. 10—At their headquarters in Mondolkiri province, Cambodia, 398 United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) guerrillas and their families hand over their weapons to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; FULRO—the last Indochinese insurgent group—fought against Communists from 1964 until this year; they will be resettled in North Carolina by the US government. ■

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
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